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TREATIES IN U.S. COURTS: 
JUDGE BORK’S ANTI-ORIGINALIST REVOLUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Robert Bork is widely known as one of the leading modern exponents of 
originalism.1 Many scholars would be surprised, therefore, to learn that Judge Bork 
authored a very influential opinion when he was a judge on the D.C. Circuit that shifted 
judicial doctrine in a direction that is directly contrary to the Founders’ original 
understanding.  The case was Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.2 The constitutional 
issue relates generally to separation of powers, and specifically to the judiciary’s role in 
treaty enforcement.  Judge Bork made new law in Tel-Oren by creating a presumption 
against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts.  To overcome that presumption, 
Bork said, individual litigants must show that the treaty creates a private right of action, 
or that Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the treaty.3
Thus, under the “Bork model” of treaty enforcement, courts lack authority to provide 
remedies for violations of individual treaty rights unless the treaty itself creates a private 
right of action, or Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the 
treaty in domestic courts. 
 
The Bork model contrasts sharply with the “Marshall model” of treaty 
enforcement, named for Chief Justice John Marshall.  Under the Marshall model, if a 
treaty is the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause, and the treaty protects 
individual rights, then the judiciary has both the power and the duty to provide remedies 
for violations of individual treaty rights, unless the treaty itself bars domestic judicial 
remedies, or Congress has enacted legislation precluding judicial enforcement of the 
treaty.  Moreover, in cases where a court has jurisdiction, the court does not need express 
authorization from the political branches – either in the form of a federal statutory right 
of action, or in the form of an express private right of action in the treaty – to provide 
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights, because it is the judiciary’s 
responsibility within our system of divided government to supply the remedy for 
violations of treaty-based individual rights.4
1 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990). 
2 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
3 See id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) (“Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to 
courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it 
expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.”). 
4 See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“Each 
treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights.  Whenever a 
right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of 
the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected.”); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the 
rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by 
the court as an act of congress.”)     
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The conflict between the Bork model and the Marshall model is directly relevant  
to two cases currently pending before the Supreme Court.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the 
Court granted cert. to decide whether Guantanamo detainees who have been designated 
for trial by military commission can “obtain judicial enforcement from an Article III 
court of rights protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention5 in an action for a writ of 
habeas corpus challenging the legality of their detention by the Executive branch.”6 In 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Court granted cert. to decide whether Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,7 which protects the rights of foreign nationals 
arrested in the United States,8 conveys “individual rights of consular notification and 
access to a foreign detainee enforceable in the Courts of the United States.”9 Both the 
D.C. Circuit in Hamdan and the Oregon Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas applied the 
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties, and concluded on that basis 
that the treaties at issue were not judicially enforceable in U.S. courts.10 If the Supreme 
Court applies the Marshall model, though, it will undoubtedly decide that both treaties 
are judicially enforceable.  Thus, the outcome of both cases may hinge on whether the 
Court applies the Marshall model or the Bork model.11 
There are three reasons why the Supreme Court should reject the Bork model.  
First, the Marshall model is consistent with the Founders’ original understanding of the 
judiciary’s role in the domestic enforcement of treaties.  The Bork model, in contrast, is 
at odds with the original understanding.  Second, the Marshall model is consistent with 
two hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The Borkian presumption against 
private enforcement of treaties, on the other hand, is a radical departure from a two-
centuries-old tradition.  Judge Bork invented that presumption in 1984; it has never been 
endorsed by the Supreme Court.  Third, application of the Bork model produces very 
harmful consequences.  When courts apply the Bork model, they perpetuate treaty 
violations by state governments, they abdicate their constitutional responsibility to 
 
5 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]. 
6 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Docket Number 05-184, Questions Presented, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00184qp.pdf. Oral argument is set for March 28, 2006.  For docket 
information, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-184.htm.
7 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 
[hereinafter VCCR]. 
8 See id., art. 36, para. 1. 
9 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Docket Number 04-10566, Questions Presented, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-10566qp.pdf. Similarly, Bustillo v. Johnson, which the Supreme 
Court consolidated with Sanchez-Llamas, presents the question whether “state courts may refuse to 
consider violations of Article 36 . . . because the treaty does not create individually enforceable rights.”  
Bustillo v. Johnson, Docket Number 05-51, Questions Presented, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00051qp.pdf. Oral argument is set for both cases on March 29, 
2006.  For docket information, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-10566.htm.
10 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 
(Or. 2005).  In Bustillo, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an unpublished order that affirmed the circuit 
court opinion without providing any rationale. 
11 In each case, it is possible for the Court to duck the question whether the treaty is judicially 
enforceable, and thus sidestep the conflict between the Marshall model and the Bork model, by deciding 
the case on other grounds. 
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This article builds upon two different strands of recent scholarship.  First, in a 
seminal article published in 1999, G. Edward White debunked what he called the “myth 
of continuity,” and demonstrated that there was a radical transformation in the 
constitutional regime of foreign relations in the period between the two World Wars.13 
His article focused on three topics: the status of executive agreements, federalism limits 
on the treaty power, and foreign sovereign immunity.  This article demonstrates that a 
similar transformation is occurring now with respect to the judicial role in treaty 
enforcement.  Courts applying the Bork model invoke the “myth of continuity” by citing 
nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions as authority.  This article debunks that myth 
by showing that nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions provide no support for the 
Bork model.  The current transformation of the judicial role in treaty enforcement is 
incomplete because the Supreme Court has not endorsed the Bork model.  If the Court 
does endorse the Bork model in Hamdan and/or Sanchez-Llamas, it would advance the 
trend described by Professor White: a trend of consolidating foreign relations power in 
the federal executive branch at the expense of other constitutional actors.14 
Second, Professors Vazquez and Flaherty have argued persuasively that the 
Framers intended treaties to be self-executing.15 Article VI of the Constitution accords 
 
12 The author intends to develop these normative claims more fully in a separate article.  The primary 
focus of this article is historical, not normative.  Even so, it is important to foreshadow the normative 
arguments to highlight the contemporary relevance of the historical analysis.  For a brief defense of the 
normative claims summarized above, see infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text. 
13 G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. 
L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1999). 
14 As applied to the POW Convention, the Bork model diminishes the power of both Congress and 
the federal judiciary.  As applied to the VCCR, the Bork model diminishes the power of both state and 
federal courts.  It effectively enhances the power of state governments to violate federal law, but it does so 
in a way that is contrary to the central purpose of the Supremacy Clause.  See infra notes 288-91 and 
accompanying text. 
15 See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and 
Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty-
Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-1114 (1992).  But see John C. 
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (contending that the Framers’ original understanding is consistent with a 
presumption against self-execution). 
In contrast to Professors Flaherty, Vazquez and Yoo, this article purposefully avoids use of the 
term “self-executing.”  Instead, it frames the issue in terms of whether particular treaty provisions are 
judicially enforceable, or whether individual litigants have the capacity to enforce treaties.  There are two 
reasons for this approach.  First, debates about self-execution tend to conflate at least three distinct 
questions: whether a treaty has the status of law in the U.S. legal system, whether it is judicially 
enforceable, and whether it creates a private right of action.  Second, recent cases involving the VCCR 
typically hold that the VCCR is not judicially enforceable, even though it is admittedly “self-executing.”  
These cases demonstrate that analysis of self-execution does not necessarily resolve the question whether a 
treaty is judicially enforceable.  
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treaties the status of law in the U.S. legal system.16 Articles III and VI empower federal 
and state courts, respectively, to enforce treaties.17 Professors Vazquez and Flaherty have 
examined a variety of Founding era sources to demonstrate that the Framers understood 
the Constitution to mean what it says: that treaties have the status of law and courts have 
the power to enforce treaties.18 It is clear, however, that all people cannot enforce all 
treaties in all cases.  Thus, the question remains: in what circumstances can individual 
litigants invoke the power of a court to obtain remedies for treaty violations?  The 
constitutional text does not answer this question.  The traditional sources of originalist 
scholarship – records of the constitutional convention, state ratifying conventions, etc. – 
shed some light on the question,19 but not much.  Since eighteenth century materials are 
inconclusive in this respect, it is instructive to examine judicial decisions from the post-
Founding period to ascertain whether they illuminate the Framers’ understanding of the 
judicial role in treaty enforcement.20 
This is the first article to present a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions between 1789 and 1838 in cases where an individual litigant raised a claim or 
defense on the basis of a treaty.  The analysis demonstrates that, during this period, the 
Supreme Court routinely applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial 
remedies for violations of individual treaty rights; it never applied the Borkian 
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. That conclusion is significant for 
two reasons.  First, for those who believe that courts should decide cases in accordance 
with the original understanding, it provides evidence that the Founders understood the 
judicial role in treaty enforcement in accordance with the Marshall model, not the Bork 
model.21 Second, for those who value judicial precedent over original intent, it 
documents the “front end” of a two-hundred year tradition in which the Supreme Court 
has consistently applied the Marshall model.22 
16 U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land.”) 
17 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising 
under . . . Treaties.”); U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (specifying that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by 
treaties).  
18 See Flaherty, supra note 15; Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1097-1114. 
19 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 22, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The 
treaties of the United states, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.  
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial 
determinations.”). 
20 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the force of constitutional precedents “tends to increase 
in proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787.”  Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 
(1969). 
21 I do not claim that the analysis of Supreme Court decisions in the first fifty years of constitutional 
history provides conclusive proof of the Framers’ original understanding.  Even so, the analysis is 
instructive because it shows a consistent pattern of judicial decision-making that conforms to the Marshall 
model.  That consistent pattern reinforces the conclusions that Professors Flaherty and Vazquez reached by 
examining Founding-era sources.  Additionally, analysis of judicial decisions enables one to draw more 
specific conclusions about the circumstances in which individual litigants can obtain judicial remedies for 
treaty violations. 
22 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive analysis of two centuries of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in treaty cases. The author plans to conduct that analysis in future work.  This 
article demonstrates that the Supreme Court consistently applied the Marshall model, not the Bork model, 
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Part One provides a conceptual overview of the distinction between the Bork 
model and the Marshall model.  The models diverge in two distinct but related ways.  
First, at the constitutional level, the Marshall model presupposes that state and federal 
courts have fairly substantial powers to enforce treaties; in contrast, the Bork model 
assumes that courts have relatively limited power to enforce treaties.  Second, at the sub-
constitutional level, the comparison illustrates a dramatic transformation that has 
occurred in the way courts conceptualize the relationship between individual rights and 
judicial remedies.  Application of the Marshall model leaves almost no gap between 
rights and remedies in the domestic law of treaties, because courts applying the Marshall 
model presume “that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . 
whenever that right is invaded.”23 In contrast, application of the Bork model leads to a 
significant gap between rights and remedies, because courts applying the Bork model 
presume, absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, that the treaty makers do not want 
U.S. courts to provide remedies for violations of individual treaty rights. 
Part Two presents a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court decisions between 
1789 and 1838 -- the first fifty years of U.S. constitutional history -- in cases where an 
individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty.  There were fifty-
seven such cases altogether.  Analysis of these cases demonstrates that every Supreme 
Court decision during this period was consistent with the Marshall model.  In contrast, at 
least thirteen of the fifty-seven cases, and arguably as many as nineteen cases, are 
inconsistent with the Bork model.  The consistent precedents of the Supreme Court 
during this period manifest the Founders’ original understanding that the judiciary has 
both the power and the duty to provide remedies for individuals whose treaty-based 
individual rights are violated, even if the treaty does not create a private right of action, 
and even if Congress has not enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the 
treaty in domestic courts. 
 
Part Three traces the origins of the Bork model.  The analysis suggests that the 
Bork model emerged in the 1970s and 1980s when lower federal courts combined two 
previously separate lines of cases: one related to the doctrine of non-self-executing 
treaties, and the other related to implied rights of action.  The merger of these two 
doctrines produced a revolution in both non-self-execution doctrine and implied right of 
action doctrine.  Whereas prior non-self-execution doctrine was generally consistent with 
the maxim “where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Borkian non-self-execution 
doctrine created a huge right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties.  Whereas 
implied right of action doctrine, as applied in the statutory context, has never imposed a 
bar to judicial enforcement of federal statutes on behalf of habeas petitioners or criminal 
defendants, courts are now applying the Borkian private right of action test to preclude 
habeas petitioners and criminal defendants from obtaining judicial remedies for violations 
of their individual treaty rights.  
 
during the first fifty years of constitutional history.  It also shows that the Supreme Court cases most 
frequently cited as authority for the Bork model do not support the Borkian presumption against private 
enforcement of treaties.  On the basis of this evidence, it is reasonable to infer that the Supreme Court has 
continued to apply the Marshall model for more than two hundred years. 
23 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries). 
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I.  
Two Models of Treaty Adjudication 
 
This article utilizes the conceptual tools of the Bork model and the Marshall 
model to frame the historical analysis.  Part One lays the groundwork for that analysis by 
providing a conceptual overview of the distinction between the Bork model and the 
Marshall model.  To clarify that distinction, it is first necessary to discuss briefly the 
relationship between primary law and remedial law. 
 
A. Rights and Remedies 
A primary legal rule specifies what the lawmaker “expects or hopes to happen 
when the arrangement works successfully.”24 A remedial rule, in contrast, “directs that a 
certain consequence, or sanction, may or shall follow upon an acknowledgment or formal 
official determination of noncompliance with the relevant primary provision.”25 
According to Hart & Sacks, the concept of a primary duty is “the central conception of 
regulatory law.”26 A primary duty is “an authoritatively recognized obligation . . . not to 
do something, or to do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way.”27 
A primary right “is the mere obverse of the duty.”28 Thus, an individual has a 
primary right under a treaty if the treaty imposes a duty on the state party “not to do 
something” to that individual, “or to do it” for that individual, “or to do it if at all only in 
a prescribed way.”  For the purposes of this article, therefore, a treaty “protects individual 
rights,” or “creates individual rights,” if an individual has a primary right under the 
treaty.  Treaties frequently create or protect individual rights.  Under the Marshall model, 
treaty provisions that protect individual rights are generally judicially enforceable, 
regardless of whether the treaty creates an express private right of action. 
 
Whereas legal rules that create or protect individual rights are primary legal rules, 
legal provisions that create private rights of action are remedial legal rules.  A private 
right of action, according to Hart & Sacks, “is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a 
[court] . . . upon a disputed question about the application of [primary rules] and to 
secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.”29 Under 
this definition, a treaty creates an express private right of action if it expressly empowers 
individuals to invoke the treaty before a domestic court to obtain the court’s judgment 
about a disputed question related to the treaty.30 
24 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122 (1994) hereinafter HART & SACKS]. 
25 Id. at 122. 
26 Id. at 130. 
27 Id. at 130. 
28 Id. at 137.   
29 Id.
30 Some modern treaties expressly authorize individuals to invoke the treaty before an international 
tribunal.  Such treaty provisions would satisfy Hart & Sacks’ definition of a private right of action.  Since 
this article focuses on judicial enforcement of treaties in domestic courts, though, this article defines the 
term “private right of action” with respect to domestic courts, not international tribunals. 
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In contrast to Hart & Sacks, some courts applying the Bork model appear to 
understand the concept of a “private right of action” to encompass two distinct ideas: a 
right of access to court, and a power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court.  
Accordingly, for the purposes of this article, a treaty creates a private right of action if it 
grants an individual a right of access to domestic court or it empowers the individual to 
invoke the treaty before that court.  (Where appropriate, the article will distinguish 
between a “right of access” and a “power to invoke”.)  Treaties rarely create express 
private rights of action.31 Under the Bork model, a treaty that does not create an express 
private right of action is generally not judicially enforceable, even if the treaty protects 
individual rights. 
 
B. Marshall v. Bork  
 
1.   Different Presumptions: In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,32 Robert Bork, 
then a federal appellate judge, wrote: 
 
Treaties of the United States, though the law of the land, do not generally 
create rights that are privately enforceable in courts.  Absent authorizing 
legislation, an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s 
provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly 
or impliedly provides a private right of action.  When no right is explicitly 
stated, courts look to the treaty as a whole to determine whether it 
evidences an intent to provide a private right of action.33 
In the first sentence, the phrase “rights that are privately enforceable in courts” 
clearly refers to remedial rights, not primary rights.  Thus, under the Bork model, there is 
a presumption that individuals are not entitled to domestic judicial remedies for violations 
of individual treaty rights.  The second sentence makes clear that there are two ways, and 
only two ways, to overcome that presumption: a) if there is “authorizing legislation” that 
empowers courts to grant judicial remedies; or b) if the treaty itself “provides a private 
right of action.”  The second and third sentences, read together, make clear that a treaty-
based private right of action could be either express or implied.  Either way, though, 
under the Bork model, there is a presumption against judicial remedies for treaty 
violations, and the individual invoking a treaty before a domestic court has the burden of 
overcoming that presumption. 
 
The Marshall model, in contrast, adopts a presumption in favor of domestic 
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights.34 The core principle of the 
 
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907, cmt. 
a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“International agreements, even those directly benefiting private 
persons, generally do not . . . provide a private cause of action in domestic courts.”) 
32 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
33 Id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring). 
34 Strictly speaking, the presumption applies only if the treaty provision at issue is the “Law of 
Land” under the Supremacy Clause.  Under the express terms of the Constitution, every treaty “made under 
the Authority of the United States” is the “supreme Law of the Land.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  For a 
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Marshall model is “that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . 
whenever that right is invaded.”35 The Marshall model does not adopt a presumption for 
or against the view that treaties create individual rights, but it recognizes that some 
treaties do create individual rights.  Whether a treaty creates or protects individual rights 
is a question of treaty interpretation.36 If a treaty does create or protect individual rights, 
the Marshall model presumes that an individual whose treaty rights were violated is 
entitled to a domestic judicial remedy.37 That presumption can be overcome if the treaty 
explicitly bars domestic judicial remedies, or if Congress has enacted legislation 
expressly precluding judicial enforcement of the treaty.  The mere failure of the political 
branches to create an express private right of action, however, is not a bar to judicial 
enforcement of a treaty provision that protects individual rights.  
 
Treaties can be invoked defensively by civil or criminal defendants, or they can 
be invoked offensively by plaintiffs.  A civil or criminal defendant does not need a right 
of access to court because he has been haled into court against his will.  Thus, when 
courts applying the Bork model suggest that an individual defendant requires a “private 
right of action” to enforce a treaty, they presumably mean that the defendant requires a 
power to invoke the treaty, not a right of access to court.38 Under the Marshallian 
presumption in favor of judicial enforcement, an individual defendant whose rights are 
protected by a treaty is presumed to have the power to invoke that treaty before a 
domestic court, absent countervailing action by the political branches.  Under the Borkian 
presumption against judicial enforcement, though, individual defendants lack the power 
to invoke treaties, even treaties that protect individual rights, unless the political branches 
have taken affirmative steps to grant individuals that power. 
 
Apart from the power to invoke a treaty, individual plaintiffs must also establish a 
right of access to court.  During the Marshall era, individual plaintiffs routinely relied on 
common law rights of action to provide a right of access to court to pursue their treaty-
based claims.39 Thus, under the Marshall model, if a plaintiff can show that he has rights 
 
detailed textual analysis of this constitutional provision, see David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: 
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 46-55 (2002).  Unless otherwise specified, this 
article is concerned only with treaty provisions that are “Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause. 
35 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting William 
Blackstone, 3 Commentaries xxx). 
36 See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2103 (O’Connor, J., dissenting on other grounds) 
(“To ascertain whether Article 36 [of the VCCR] confers a right on individuals, we first look to the treaty’s 
text as we would with a statute’s.”). 
37 See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (“But a treaty may 
also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations 
residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are 
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.”). 
38 See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-76 (Or. 2005) (suggesting, in a case where a 
criminal defendant sought to invoke the VCCR as the basis for a defense in a criminal proceeding, that 
treaties are “enforceable by individuals” only if the “treaty as a whole” manifests an intent to create “an 
individual right of action”). 
39 See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489 (1824) (suit to foreclose on mortgage); Soc’y for 
Propagation of Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823) (action for ejectment); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. 
594 (1818) (equitable action to divide a tract of land); Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. 259 (1817) 
(action for ejectment); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. 185 (1808) (suit for breach of contract); 
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protected by a treaty, and he has a right of access to court based on common law or other 
domestic law sources, there is no additional showing required to establish that he has the 
power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court.  Under the Bork model, though, even 
if a plaintiff has rights protected by a treaty, and even if a federal statute grants him a 
right of access to U.S. courts, he must still identify some other statutory or treaty 
provision that grants him the power to invoke the treaty before a domestic court.40 
In sum, the two models apply opposing presumptions in cases where an individual 
litigant seeks judicial enforcement of a treaty that protects individual rights, but that does 
not create an express private right of action.  Under the Bork model, courts exceed their 
authority if they grant remedies to individuals for violations of such treaties, unless 
Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private enforcement of the treaty.  Under the 
Marshall model, courts abdicate their responsibility if they refuse to grant remedies for 
violations of such treaties, unless the treaty explicitly bars domestic judicial remedies, or 
Congress has enacted legislation expressly precluding judicial enforcement of the treaty. 
 
2.   Different Methodologies: In a famous speech in 1897, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes declared that it puts “the cart before the horse . . . to consider the right or the duty 
as something existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to 
which certain sanctions are added afterward.”41 In an equally famous critique of Holmes, 
Henry Hart stated: “Holmes’ ‘cart’ is the horse and his ‘horse’ is the cart. . . . The 
remedial parts of law – rights of action and other sanctions – are subsidiary.  To the 
primary parts they have the relation of means to ends.  They come second not first.”42 
Courts applying the Bork model are the intellectual descendants of Holmes.  They 
typically begin by asking questions about remedial law, not primary law.  Under the 
Borkian method, it would be inappropriate for a court to consider whether a treaty 
protects individual rights, or whether those rights have been violated, until after the court 
has determined that the individual has a private right of action.  If the individual lacks a 
private right of action, then the individual is not entitled to a judicial remedy in any case, 
so it would be a waste of judicial resources to attempt to answer questions about primary 
rights. 
 
Courts applying the Marshall model, by contrast, can be viewed as the intellectual 
predecessors or descendants of Henry Hart.  They typically begin by asking questions 
about primary law, not remedial law, because the “remedial parts of law . . . come second 
not first.”43 Under the Marshallian method, it is not necessary to inquire whether the 
 
Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. 415 (1808) (suit to foreclose on mortgage); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) 
(suit to recover payment on bond); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804) (suit to recover payment on 
bond). 
40 This is the logic of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).  The petitioner filed a habeas petition to enforce his rights under the POW Convention.  The D.C. 
Circuit said: “The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on a private right of action . 
. . but it does not render a treaty judicially enforceable.”  Id. at 40. 
41 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897). 
42 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism – An Addendum, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 929, 935 (1951). 
43 Id.
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treaty creates a private right of action, because every individual who is properly before 
the court44 and whose individual treaty rights have been violated is entitled to a judicial 
remedy, assuming that the political branches have not foreclosed judicial remedies.  By 
deciding explicitly that the individual’s rights have been violated, the court also decides 
(implicitly, at least) that the individual is entitled to a remedy.  Of course, individual 
cases may raise difficult questions about the appropriate remedy.  In the vast majority of 
cases, though, the central question of remedial law – whether the individual is entitled to 
some remedy – does not require separate analysis, because the court answers that 
question by deciding whether the individual’s primary rights have been violated.45 
In short, the Marshall model applies a “rights-focused” methodology, whereas the 
Bork model applies a “remedies-focused” methodology.  The contrast between the 
Marshallian and Borkian methodologies has tremendous practical significance because 
treaties rarely create an express private right of action, and Congress rarely enacts 
legislation authorizing individuals to enforce a specific treaty.  Therefore, if the Supreme 
Court endorses the Bork model, it will lead to a substantial right-remedy gap in the 
domestic law of treaties.  If the Supreme Court continues to apply the Marshall model, 
though, it would minimize the right-remedy gap, because most treaties that protect 
individual rights would be judicially enforceable. 
 
II. 
The Marshall Model in Action: 1789-1838 
 
Part Two presents a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court decisions between 
1789 and 1838 in which an individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a 
treaty.  The year 1838 provides an appropriate closing date for this analysis.  To present a 
complete picture of the Marshall model, it is necessary to extend the analysis at least until 
1835, the last year that John Marshall served on the Court.  If the analysis stops in 1835, 
though, one loses an important part of the picture.  Judge Bork and others have relied 
heavily on Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson46 to support the Bork model.47 In 
Garcia v. Lee,48 decided in 1838, Chief Justice Taney authored an opinion that helps 
illuminate Marshall’s inscrutable analysis in Foster. Thus, to obtain a clear 
understanding of Marshall’s opinion in Foster – and to demonstrate conclusively that 
Foster provides no support for the Bork model – it is essential to analyze the aftermath of 
Foster up through and including Taney’s 1838 decision in Garcia v. Lee.
44 An individual defendant is properly before the court if he is subject to the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.  Under the Marshall model, an individual plaintiff is properly before the court if there is some 
provision of law – common law, statute, treaty, or other – that grants him a right of access to court. 
45 Under the Marshall model, there are three circumstances in which an individual whose treaty 
rights were violated is not entitled to a remedy: 1) if the political branches have taken affirmative action to 
limit judicial remedies; 2) if the individual did not suffer any harm or prejudice as a result of the treaty 
violation; or 3) if the defendant is protected by an affirmative defense, such as sovereign immunity. 
46 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
47 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d at 38-39 (citing Foster); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (citing Foster); State v. Sanchez-
Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005) (citing Foster). 
48 37 U.S. 511 (1838). 
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Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided 57 cases in which an 
individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty.49 These 57 cases 
include: 22 cases involving disputes over title to property in Louisiana or Florida 
(territories that the U.S. acquired by treaties with France and Spain, respectively); 16 
other cases involving disputes over title to real property; 11 admiralty cases; and 8 cases 
that are neither admiralty nor property cases.   
 
Part Two analyzes the results of Supreme Court decisions during this period to 
determine which results are consistent with the Marshall model and which results are 
consistent with the Bork model.  Since few cases explicitly endorse the core premises of 
either model, it is necessary to examine what the Court did, as well as what the Court 
said, to ascertain which cases are consistent with which model.  The analysis shows that 
every Supreme Court decision during this period was consistent with the Marshallian 
presumption in favor of judicial remedies.50 In contrast, none of the 57 cases endorse the 
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties.  Moreover, there was not a 
single Supreme Court decision during this period suggesting that individuals cannot 
enforce treaties in the absence of a statutory or treaty-based right of action.   
 
Part Two is divided into four sections.  The first section analyzes cases in which 
the party invoking the treaty won on the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total 
of 34 cases.  The second section addresses cases where the Court declined to reach the 
merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total of 7 cases.  The third section discusses 
cases in which the party invoking the treaty lost on the merits of a treaty-based claim or 
defense; there were 16 such cases.  The final section examines one of those 16 cases, 
Foster v. Neilson, in greater detail. 
 
A. Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Won on the Merits 
 
49 This figure does not include cases involving treaties with Indian tribes.  Only cases involving 
treaties with foreign nations are included. 
Cases where an individual plaintiff invoked a treaty in reply to a defense raised by the defendant 
are included.  However, cases where the Court cited a treaty as evidence supporting a contested 
proposition, but where neither party asserted an individual right on the basis of that treaty, are excluded.  
See, e.g., Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. 523 (1827) (where neither party asserted individual right on basis of 
peace treaty between U.S. and Britain, Court cited treaty as evidence that land at issue was part of United 
States in 1777).  
The phrase “individual litigant” includes companies as well as natural persons.  See, e.g., Soc’y for 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823) (suit by British corporation).  It also 
includes individual officials of foreign governments who file suit to represent the interests of their 
government, or of their country’s nationals.  See, e.g., The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. 52 (1819) (petition filed 
by Spanish consul on behalf of Spanish nationals).  Since the article focuses on treaty enforcement by 
individual litigants, cases where the adverse parties are both government entities are excluded.  See, e.g., 
New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).  
50 Of the 57 treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided during this period, only three create a slight 
right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties: Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 
27 U.S. 253 (1829); and De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. 599 (1827).  For the reasons explained below, 
all three are consistent with the Marshall model.  See infra notes 161-234 and accompanying text. 
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Of the 57 treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided between 1789 and 1838, 
the individual invoking the treaty won his treaty-based claim or defense 34 times.51 
Those 34 cases are all consistent with the Marshall model because, in each case, the 
Court enforced the treaty on behalf of an individual litigant.  To determine whether the 
cases are consistent with the Bork model, it is essential to determine whether the 
individual invoking the treaty had a statutory or treaty-based right of action.  Since the 
Court almost never addressed this question in its opinions, it is necessary to look beyond 
the text of the opinions to determine whether a particular case is consistent with the Bork 
model.52 The cases divide into four groups: twelve cases where the individual litigant 
had a statutory right of action;53 three cases where the treaty provided an express private 
right of action;54 thirteen cases that are clearly inconsistent with the Bork model because 
the Court awarded remedies on the basis of a treaty even though there was no statutory or 
treaty-based right of action;55 and six cases that are arguably inconsistent with the Bork 
model because there was no statutory right of action, and it is debatable whether the 
treaty created a private right of action.56 
1.  Cases Involving a Statutory Right of Action: The United States acquired 
Louisiana from France by a treaty signed in 1803.57 Under Article 3 of that treaty, the 
United States promised that “[t]he inhabitants of the ceded territory . . . shall be 
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their . . . property.”58 At the time of 
the acquisition, many individuals had private property rights based upon grants received 
from prior French and Spanish governments.  Congress, therefore, enacted legislation in 
1805 that authorized the President to appoint commissioners to conduct hearings and 
review evidence for the purpose of distinguishing between valid and invalid property 
claims.59 Over the next two decades, Congress passed a series of laws regulating titles to 
 
51 If a party who invokes a treaty wins the case, but loses on the treaty issue, that counts as a loss.  
See, e.g., Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 (1830) (where British 
company filed ejectment action against town, Court affirmed plaintiff’s right to recover possession of land, 
but rejected plaintiff’s treaty-based claim for mesne profits).  If both parties assert rights under a treaty, and 
one party wins its treaty-based claim or defense, that counts as a win.  See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 
133 (1795) (where Dutch ship owners sought to recover property captured by privateers who claimed to be 
French, and captors invoked treaty with France as a bar to court’s jurisdiction, the Court rejected the 
jurisdictional objection and ruled in favor of Dutch ship owners on the basis of a treaty with the 
Netherlands). 
52 The fact that the vast majority of Supreme Court opinions during this period did not even consider 
whether the treaty at issue provided a private right of action is itself compelling evidence that the Court did 
not endorse or apply the Bork model. 
53 See infra Part II.A(1). 
54 See infra Part II.A(2). 
55 See infra Part II.A(3). 
56 See infra Part II.A(4). 
57 Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, April 30, 1803, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other 
International Acts of the United States of America 498 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “Louisiana 
Treaty”]. 
58 Id., art. 3, at 501. 
59 See “An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land, within the territory of 
Orleans, and the district of Louisiana,” March 2, 1805, sec. 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327. 
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land in the territory acquired from France.60 Ultimately, in 1824, Congress created a 
federal statutory cause of action authorizing individuals who claimed property rights 
“protected or secured by the treaty between the United States of America and the French 
republic . . . to present a petition to the district court of the state of Missouri.”61 During 
the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided three cases where plaintiffs asserting a claim on 
the basis of this federal statute won on the merits of those claims.62 
The United States acquired Florida from Spain by a treaty signed in 1819.63 
Under Article 8 of that treaty, the United States promised to respect the property rights of 
individuals who had valid titles based on prior Spanish land grants.64 Congress wanted to 
implement that treaty obligation, while simultaneously establishing safeguards to prevent 
the distribution of large tracts of land to individuals with fraudulent claims.  Accordingly, 
in 1822, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the President to appoint commissioners 
to conduct hearings and review evidence for the purpose of distinguishing between valid 
and invalid property claims.65 The initial statutory scheme was purely administrative, 
with no provision for judicial review.  In 1828, though, Congress created a federal 
statutory cause of action for individuals who claimed property rights protected by Article 
8 of the Florida Treaty.66 During the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided nine cases where 
 
60 See Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to Louisiana, 43 Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review No. 1, 39-58 (1956); Harry L. Coles, Jr., The Confirmation of Foreign Land 
Titles in Louisiana, 38 Louisiana Historical Quarterly No. 4, 1-22 (1955).  See also 2 Stat. 324-25 
(summarizing legislation from 1804 to 1843). 
61 An Act enabling the claimants to lands within the limits of the state of Missouri and territory of 
Arkansas to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims,” May 26, 1824, 4 Stat. 52.  The statute 
says, in relevant part: 
That it shall and may be lawful for any person . . . claiming lands . . . within the state of 
Missouri, by virtue of any French or Spanish grant . . . which was protected or secured by 
the treaty between the United States of America and the French republic . . . to present a 
petition to the district court of the state of Missouri . . . and the said court is hereby 
authorized and required to hold and exercise jurisdiction of every petition, presented in 
conformity with the provisions of this act . . . . 
62 Mackey v. U.S., 35 U.S. 340 (1836); Soulard’s Heirs v. U.S., 35 U.S. 100 (1836); Delassus v. 
U.S., 34 U.S. 117 (1835). 
63 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, reprinted in 3 Treaties and 
Other International Acts of the United States of America 3 (Hunter Miller ed., 1933) [hereinafter, “Florida 
Treaty”]. 
64 Id., art. 8, at 9 (“All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by His Catholic 
Majesty or by his lawful authorities in the said Territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, shall 
be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands . . . .”) 
65 See “An Act for ascertaining claims and titles to land within the territory of Florida,” May 8, 1822, 
3 Stat. 709.  
66 See “An act supplementary to the several acts providing for the settlement and confirmation of 
private land claims in Florida,” May 23, 1828, 4 Stat. 284.  Section 6 of the Act says: 
That all claims to land within the territory of Florida, embraced by the treaty between 
Spain and the United States . . . shall be received and adjudicated by the judge of the 
superior court of the district within which the land lies, upon the petition of the claimant, 
according to the forms, rules, regulations, conditions, restrictions, and limitations 
prescribed to the district judge, and claimants in the state of Missouri” by the act of May 
26, 1824. 
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plaintiffs asserting a claim on the basis of this federal statute won on the merits of their   
treaty-based claims.67 
All twelve cases where plaintiffs prevailed (three Missouri cases and nine Florida 
cases) are consistent with the Marshall model because the court granted remedies to the 
individual plaintiffs to protect their treaty-based rights.  All twelve cases are also 
consistent with the Bork model, because Congress had enacted federal statutes 
authorizing judicial enforcement of those claims.68 Even so, none of the cases endorse 
the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties. 
 
2.  Cases Involving a Treaty-Based Right of Action: In Higginson v. Mein,69 a 
British mortgagee sued to foreclose on a mortgage related to land in Georgia.  The State 
of Georgia had confiscated the mortgaged property during the Revolutionary War.70 The 
British plaintiff invoked Article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, which protected the 
rights of “all Persons who have any Interest in confiscated Lands, either by Debts, 
Marriage Settlements, or otherwise.”71 Article 5 granted the plaintiff an express private 
right of action.72 The Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff.   
 
The Bello Corrunes73 and The Pizarro74 were both admiralty cases involving 
disputes between U.S. captors and Spanish ship owners.  In both cases, Article XX of the 
1795 Treaty with Spain granted Spanish ship owners an express private right of action 
authorizing suits in U.S. courts.75 In both cases, the Court awarded judgment to the 
 
67 U.S. v. Sibbald, 35 U.S. 313 (1836); U.S. v. Seton, 35 U.S. 309 (1836); U.S. v. Fernandez, 35 U.S. 
303 (1836); Mitchel v. U.S., 34 U.S. 711 (1835); U.S. v. Clarke, 34 U.S. 168 (1835); U.S. v. Huertas, 33 
U.S. 488 (1834) (plaintiff wins claim for 11,000 acres but loses claim for 4000 acres); U.S. v. Clarke, 33 
U.S. 436 (1834) (plaintiff wins claim for 8000 acres but loses claim for other land); U.S. v. Percheman, 32 
U.S. 51 (1833); U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832). 
68 Since all twelve cases involved claims against the United States, plaintiffs relied on federal 
statutes to overcome what would otherwise be a valid sovereign immunity defense. 
69 8 U.S. 415 (1808). 
70 Id. at 418-19. 
71 Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. 5, U.S.-Great Britain, reprinted in 2 Treaties and 
Other International Acts of the United States of America, 151, 154 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931). 
72 See id., art. 5 (“And it is agreed that all Persons who have any Interest in confiscated Lands . . . 
shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the Prosecution of their just Rights.”)   
The text states explicitly that persons “shall meet with no lawful Impediment in the Prosecution of 
their just Rights.”  The text also identifies the persons to whom it applies: those “who have any Interest in 
confiscated Lands.”  The treaty specifically authorizes them to prosecute “their just rights” in the 
confiscated lands, which are restored by article 5.  It is difficult to imagine what else the treaty drafters 
would have to say in order to satisfy the Borkian requirement for a private right of action.  In contrast, 
neither article 4 nor article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace creates an express private right of action.  
For analysis of those articles, see infra notes 98-119 and 128-39 and accompanying text.   
73 19 U.S. 152 (1821). 
74 15 U.S. 227 (1817). 
75 Treaty of Frienship, Limits and Navigation, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 20, U.S.-Spain, reprinted in 2 
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 318, 334-35 (Hunter Miller ed., 
1931) [hereinafter, “1795 Treaty with Spain”] (“It is also agreed that the inhabitants of the territories of 
each party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the other, and they shall be 
permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their properties . . .  and for obtaining satisfaction for the 
damages which they may have sustained . . . .”). 
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Spanish ship owners on the grounds that American privateers who captured the ships had 
violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain.76 
Higginson, Bello Corrunes, and Pizarro are all consistent with the Marshall 
model because, in each case, the Court awarded a remedy to an individual victim of a 
treaty violation.  All three cases are also consistent with the Bork model because the 
treaties at issue granted the individual litigants an express private right of action.  None of 
these cases, however, endorse the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of 
treaties.  Moreover, none of the cases state or imply that individual litigants could not 
enforce the treaty in the absence of a treaty-based right of action.   
 
3.  Cases in Which There was no Express Private Right of Action: The Supreme 
Court decided thirteen cases between 1789 and 1838 in which an individual litigant won 
on the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, even though the treaty at issue did not 
create an express private right of action, and Congress had not enacted legislation 
authorizing private enforcement of the treaty in domestic courts.  The thirteen cases 
include three admiralty cases,77 five cases involving creditor-debtor disputes,78 and five 
other cases.79 In all thirteen cases, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in 
favor of judicial remedies.  In every case, the Court would have reached a different result 
if it had applied the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies.  Thus, these cases are 
clearly inconsistent with the Bork model; they provide strong support for the Marshall 
model. 
 
a.  Admiralty Cases: In Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne,80 a French privateer 
had captured a British vessel.  The British Consul filed a libel, seeking restitution on the 
grounds that the French privateer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port.  In 
response, the privateer invoked article 19 of a 1778 treaty with France,81 which granted 
the privateer a right to enter a U.S. port for repairs.  The Court held that the treaty 
protected the privateer’s activities in this case.82 Accordingly, the Court awarded 
judgment to the French privateer on the basis of the treaty, even though the treaty at issue 
 
76 See Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. at 171-72 (holding that the privateer had violated article XIV of the 
1795 treaty with Spain), and at 154-55 (noting that the Circuit court had ordered restoration of the ship to 
the Spanish owners) and at 175-76 (affirming the Circuit court order in all relevant respects); Pizarro, 15 
U.S. at 242-47 (holding that the capture violated article XV of the 1795 treaty with Spain, and ordering 
restitution of the ship to the Spanish owners). 
77 U.S. v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. 319 (1796); 
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795). 
78 Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I); 
Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 
3 U.S. 1 (1794). 
79 Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. 1 (1830); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825); Soc’y for Propagation 
of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 464 (1823); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. 259 (1817); 
Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co., 8 U.S. 185 (1808). 
80 3 U.S. 319 (1796). 
81 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, art. 19, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and 
Other International Acts of the United States of America 3, 17-18 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, 
“1778 Treaty with France”]. 
82 See Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. at 319. 
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did not create an express private right of action,83 and there was no federal statute, other 
than the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that authorized the prevailing party to 
enforce the treaty in a U.S. court. 
 
Talbot v. Jansen  involved a Dutch brigantine, the Magdalena, which had been 
captured by privateers.84 The Dutch ship owners argued that the capture violated article 
19 of a 1782 treaty with the Netherlands.85 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
Dutch ship owners,86 producing four separate opinions in support of that result.  Two of 
the four opinions held expressly that the capture violated the 1782 Treaty with the 
Netherlands, and that the ship owners were entitled to a remedy on that basis.87 As in 
Moodie, the Court granted a remedy to the ship owners even though the treaty at issue did 
not create an express private right of action,88 and there was no federal statute, other than 
the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that authorized the ship owners to enforce the 
treaty in a U.S. court. 
 
Moodie and Talbot are both consistent with the Marshall model, but they are 
squarely inconsistent with the Bork model.  In accordance with the Marshall model, the 
Court assumed that the treaties at issue were judicially enforceable on behalf of private 
parties,89 even though the treaties did not expressly empower individuals to invoke those 
treaties before a U.S. court.  Contrary to the Bork model, the absence of any statutory or 
treaty provision that expressly authorized private enforcement was not a bar to private 
enforcement of the treaty.     
 
83 Article 19 of the 1778 treaty with France protects the right of French mariners who seek shelter in 
U.S. ports to obtain “all things needful for . . . reparation of their Ships” and to “depart when and whither 
they please without any let or hindrance.”  1778 Treaty with France, supra note 81, art. 19.  The treaty does 
not contain any language that expressly empowers French citizens to invoke that provision before a U.S. 
court. 
84 3 U.S. 133 (1795). 
85 Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, art. 19, U.S.-Netherlands, reprinted in 2 Treaties 
and Other International Acts of the United States of America 59, 76-77 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) 
[hereinafter, “1782 Treaty with Netherlands”].  Article 19 prohibited U.S. citizens from accepting a 
commission from any state at war with the Netherlands “for arming any Ship or Ships, to act as Privateers” 
against Dutch ships.  One of the captors, Talbot, was allegedly a U.S. citizen who had accepted a 
commission from France, which was at war with the Netherlands.   Talbot claimed that article 19 did not 
apply to him because he had renounced his U.S. citizenship, and acquired French citizenship.  Justice 
Paterson, who wrote one of the two main opinions in the case, would have resolved the case on other 
grounds, without deciding whether Talbot was a French citizen.  See Talbot, 3 U.S. at 152-58 (Paterson, J.).  
Justice Iredell, who wrote the other main opinion in the case, held squarely that Talbot was a U.S. citizen.  
See id. at 161-65 (Iredell, J.). 
86 Id. at 169. 
87 See id. at 165 (Iredell, J.) (concluding that Talbot had a “duty of not cruising against the Dutch, in 
violation of the law of nations, generally, and of the treaty with Holland, in particular”); id. at 169 
(Rutledge, C.J.) (stating that the capture “was a violation of the law of nations, and of the treaty with 
Holland”). 
88 Article 19 provides expressly that any individual who violates its terms “shall be punished as a 
pirate.”  1782 Treaty with Netherlands, supra note 85, art. 19, at 76-77.  The treaty does not provide for 
civil actions against individuals who commit acts of piracy. 
89 See Moodie, 3 U.S. at 319 (Elsworth, C.J.) (“Suggestions of policy and conveniency cannot be 
considered in the judicial determination of a question of right: the treaty with France . . . must have its 
effect.”) 
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In United States v. Schooner Peggy,90 the Court ruled in favor of the French 
owners of a schooner captured by a U.S. naval vessel, holding that Article 4 of the 1800 
Convention with France granted the French owners a right to recover the captured 
property.91 Article 4 granted the French owners a primary right to regain possession of 
the ship, but it did not explicitly empower them to enforce that right in a U.S. court.92 
Nor was there any federal statute, other than the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 
that authorized the French ship owners to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court.  One could 
argue that Article 22 of the 1800 Convention with France granted the French ship owners 
a private right of action.93 It is unlikely, though, that Article 22 was intended to create a 
private right of action.94 Moreover, even if one reads Article 22 to create a right of 
action, it is questionable whether that right of action applied to cases, such as Schooner 
Peggy, implicating Article 4 of the treaty.95 
In any case, the Court’s opinion makes no reference to Article 22, and does not 
rely on that treaty provision as a basis for a private right of action.  Rather, the Court’s 
rationale was that “[t]he court is as much bound as the executive to take notice of a treaty, 
and will . . . decree restoration of the property under the treaty.”96 In accordance with the 
Marshall model, the Court assumed that Article 4 was judicially enforceable by private 
parties, even though that article did not expressly empower individuals to invoke the 
treaty before a U.S. court.  Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated: 
 
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme 
law of the land.  Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United 
States must be admitted. . . . [W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as 
 
90 5 U.S. 103 (1801). 
91 See id. at 108-110. 
92 Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America, Sept. 30, 1800, art. 4, 
U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America 457, 459-
62 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “1800 Convention with France”] (stipulating that “property 
captured, and not yet definitively condemned . . . shall be mutually restored”).   
93 See id., art. 22 (“It is further agreed that in all cases, the established courts for Prize Causes, in the 
Country to which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of them.”). 
94 During the 1790s, there were a series of cases in which French nationals challenged the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to adjudicate prize cases involving French captors.  See, e.g., Glass v. The Sloop 
Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 9 (1794) (French captor asserts “[t]hat by the law of nations, the courts of the captor can 
alone determine the question of prize or no prize”).  The United States, on the other hand, claimed that 
prize cases involving French captors were subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if captors brought the 
ship into a U.S. port.  See id., at 16 (rejecting the French captor’s jurisdictional objection and affirming the 
jurisdiction of the district court).  The stipulation in article 22 – authorizing courts in the country to which 
the prizes may be conducted to take cognizance of cases – was probably added to the treaty to resolve this 
issue, rather than to create a private right of action. 
95 The 1800 Convention with France served two distinct goals.  First, it was a peace treaty that 
terminated the undeclared war between the U.S. and France.  Articles 1-5 were backward-looking and were 
intended to codify the termination of the war.  Second, Articles 6-27 were forward looking and were 
designed to govern future relations.  Hence, the word “cases” in Article 22 may have been intended to 
include only the admiralty cases addressed in articles 6-27, not the cases implicating article 4, which 
addressed property captured during the war. 
96 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 103-04. 
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such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much 
binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of 
congress; and . . . to condemn a vessel, the restoration of which is directed 
by a law of the land, would be a direct infraction of that law, and of 
consequence improper.97 
In Marshall’s view, it was immaterial whether the treaty created a private right of action 
because the Court had a duty under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the treaty on behalf 
of the French ship owners.  Thus, Schooner Peggy is inconsistent with the Bork model. 
 
b.  Creditor-Debtor Disputes: During the period under study, the Supreme Court 
decided five cases in which it awarded judgment to British creditors on the basis of 
article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.  Ware v. Hylton98 is representative of these 
cases.  In Ware, a British creditor sued U.S. debtors to collect payment on a bond that 
dated from 1774.99 In 1777, during the Revolutionary War, the Virginia legislature 
“passed a law to sequester British property.”100 In 1780, pursuant to that Virginia law, 
the U.S. debtors paid a portion of their debt into a loan office established by the State of 
Virginia.  After the war was over, when the British creditor sued to recover payment on 
the bond, the defendants pled the Virginia law, and their payment into the loan office, as 
a bar to the suit.101 In reply to that defense, the plaintiff invoked Article 4 of the peace 
treaty.102 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff, holding that “the 4th 
article of the said treaty nullifies the law of Virginia . . .; destroys the payment made 
under it; and revives the debt.”103 The Court applied a Marshallian presumption in favor 
of judicial remedies, granting a remedy to the British plaintiff, despite the fact that neither 
the treaty nor a federal statute granted the plaintiff a private right of action.104 
In addition to Ware, the Supreme Court decided three other cases implicating 
Article 4 in which British creditors sued U.S. debtors to recover debts that had been 
confiscated or sequestered during the Revolutionary War.105 In one other case, the State 
of Georgia sued a British creditor, and the creditor invoked Article 4 defensively to assert 
his entitlement to a debt sequestered during the war.106 In all four cases, the Court ruled 
in favor of the British creditors.107 Like Ware, these cases are inconsistent with the Bork 
 
97 Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 109-110 (Marshall, C.J.). 
98 3 U.S. 199 (1796). 
99 Id. at 199. 
100 Id. at 220 (Chase, J.). 
101 Id. at 221. 
102 Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall 
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts 
heretofore contracted”). 
103 Ware, 3 U.S. at 235 (Chase, J.). 
104 The plaintiff’s suit was based on the common law right of action to recover payment on a bond.  
105 Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I); 
Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804). 
106 State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (1794). 
107 Hopkirk II, 8 U.S. 164 (reaffirming Hopkirk I); Hopkirk I, 7 U.S. 454 (ordering debtor to pay debt 
wrongfully withheld from creditor in violation of article 4 of Definitive Treaty of Peace); Ogden, 6 U.S. 
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model because the Court granted remedies to British creditors even though Article 4 did 
not grant the creditors a private right of action, and there was no federal statute that 
empowered British creditors to invoke the treaty before a U.S. court.   
 
Defenders of the Bork model might contend that Article 4 does create a private 
right of action.  The treaty states explicitly “that Creditors on either Side shall meet with 
no lawful Impediment to the Recovery . . . of all bona fide Debts heretofore contracted.”  
This language, one could argue, manifests the drafters’ expectation that private 
individuals could enforce the treaty in domestic courts.  Moreover, the Court stated 
explicitly in Ware that the phrase “to the Recovery” refers “to the right of action, 
judgment, and execution. . . . The word recovery is very comprehensive and operates, in 
the present case, to give remedy from the commencement of suit, to the receipt of the 
money.”108 Thus, one could argue, Ware and the other Article 4 cases are consistent with 
the Bork model because they are cases where the treaty itself created a private right of 
action. 
 
This argument is not persuasive.  The express language of Article 4 says nothing 
about courts or lawsuits; it merely refers to recovery of debts.109 Hart & Sacks would 
characterize Article 4 as a primary rule because it specifies what the treaty drafters expect 
“to happen when the arrangement works successfully.”110 It is not a remedial rule 
because it does not specify “that a certain consequence, or sanction, may or shall follow 
upon . . . noncompliance with the relevant primary provision.”111 In this respect, Article 
4 differs markedly from provisions of other contemporaneous treaties that create an 
express private right of action.  Unlike those treaty provisions, which expressly require 
enforcement in domestic courts,112 the United States could have fulfilled its obligations 
under Article 4 without any judicial involvement.113 
272 (same); Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (holding that article 4 of Definitive Treaty of Peace protected British 
defendant’s right to recover debt). 
108 Ware, 3 U.S. at 241.  See also Brailsford, 3 U.S. at 5 (stating that “the very terms of the treaty, 
revived the right of action to recover the debt”). 
109 Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall 
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts 
heretofore contracted”). 
110 Hart & Sacks, supra note 24, at 122. 
111 Id.
112 See, e.g., 1795 Treaty with Spain, supra note 75, art. 20, at 334-35 (“It is also agreed that the 
inhabitants of the territories of each party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the 
other, and they shall be permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their properties . . .  and for 
obtaining satisfaction for the damages which they may have sustained . . . .”). 
113 In fact, the U.S. later agreed on non-judicial means to execute its obligations under Article 4 
because British creditors had ongoing problems enforcing their rights in U.S. courts.  See JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 741-56 (1971) (Volume I of The Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States) (recounting history of efforts by British 
creditors to recover pre-war debts).  The United States agreed in the 1794 Jay Treaty that “The United 
States will make full and complete Compensation for” debts owed by U.S. citizens to British creditors.  See 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, art. 6, U.S.-Great Britain, reprinted in 2 
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, 245, 250 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) 
[hereinafter, “Jay Treaty”].  Moreover, the treaty established a bilateral U.S.-British arbitral tribunal that 
provided a non-judicial forum where British creditors could enforce their rights protected by Article 4 of 
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Perhaps more importantly, Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace is virtually 
indistinguishable from Article 36(2) of the VCCR.  Whereas Article 4 specifies that 
creditors “shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value” of 
debts, Article 36(2) specifies that U.S. “laws and regulations must enable full effect to be 
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended.”114 
Both provisions, in essence, say that states parties cannot interpose domestic law as an 
obstacle to prevent individuals whose rights are protected by the treaty from deriving the 
full benefit of those rights.  U.S. courts applying the Bork model have uniformly held that 
Article 36(2) of the VCCR does not authorize judicial enforcement on behalf of private 
individuals.115 Defenders of the Bork model cannot have it both ways.  Their claim that 
Article 36(2) does not authorize domestic judicial enforcement contradicts the argument 
that Ware and the other Article 4 cases are consistent with the Bork model. 
 
In light of these observations, consider again the Court’s statement in Ware that 
the word “recovery” in Article 4 refers “to the right of action . . . and operates, in the 
present case, to give remedy from the commencement of suit, to the receipt of the 
money.”116 This statement, viewed in the proper historical context, manifests the Court’s 
tacit assumption that “where there is a right, there is a remedy.”117 Article 4, by its terms, 
creates a primary duty for debtors to pay, and a correlative primary right for creditors to 
be paid.118 The Court inferred, on the basis of this primary rule, that creditors must have 
a judicial remedy in cases where debtors refuse to pay their debts, because “where there 
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”119 In 
short, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies. 
 
the peace treaty.  Id. The tribunal ceased operations in 1798, but the United States and Great Britain 
concluded a new treaty in 1802 “by which the United States agreed to pay the sum of 600,000 pounds in 
satisfaction of claims for pre-war debts.”  GOEBEL, supra, at 756.   
Even after ratification of the 1802 treaty, the Supreme Court continued to enforce Article 4 of the 
Definitive Treaty of Peace on behalf of British plaintiffs.  Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); 
Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. 272 (1804).  This fact is 
directly relevant to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), one of the cases currently pending 
before the Supreme Court.  In Hamdan, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the POW Convention is not 
judicially enforceable because the Convention provides international dispute resolution mechanisms.  See 
id. at 38-40.  In the early nineteenth century, though, the Supreme Court continued to enforce Article 4 of 
the peace treaty on behalf of British plaintiffs, even after the parties had created an international mechanism 
designed specifically to resolve disputes related to Article 4.  Thus, the logic of Hamdan is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s treatment of the British creditor cases. 
114 VCCR, supra note 7, art. 36, para. 2. 
115 See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-78 (Or. 2005) (applying the Bork model and 
concluding on that basis “that the obligations that Article 36 describes are enforceable only by the affected 
signatory states and not by individual detainees”). 
116 Ware, 3 U.S. at 241. 
117 This is a translation of the Latin maxim “ubi jus, ibi remedium.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary (6th 
ed. 1990). 
118 Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 4 (stipulating “that Creditors on either Side shall 
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all bona fide Debts 
heretofore contracted”).  A remedial rule, creating a private right of action, would have specified that if 
debtors refuse to pay, creditors may bring suit to enforce their rights. 
119 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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c.   Other Cases That are Inconsistent with the Bork Model: During the period 
under study, the Court decided five other cases that are inconsistent with the Borkian 
presumption against judicial remedies for treaty violations. 
 
In Chirac v. Chirac,120 the French heirs of John Baptiste Chirac brought an action 
for ejectment to gain possession of real estate in Maryland.  If the Court had applied 
Maryland law, the land would have escheated to the state.121 In support of their action for 
ejectment, the French heirs invoked Article 7 of the 1800 Convention with France, which 
protected the rights of French subjects holding property in the United States.122 Neither 
Article 7 nor any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiffs to 
enforce the treaty in a domestic court.  Regardless, Justice Marshall, writing for the court, 
enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding that the treaty “does away the 
incapacity of alienage, and places the defendants in error in precisely the same situation, 
with respect to lands, as if they had become citizens.”123 
In Carneal v. Banks,124 the plaintiff sued to rescind a land swap contract with 
defendants.  Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants did not have a valid title to the 
land they promised to transfer because their title was derived from Lacassaign, a French 
national, whose alienage precluded him from conveying title to the property.125 In 
response, defendants invoked Article 11 of the 1778 Treaty with France, which protects 
the property rights of French subjects residing in the United States.126 Neither Article 11 
nor any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the defendants to enforce 
the treaty in a domestic court.  Regardless, Justice Marshall, writing for the court, applied 
the treaty on behalf of the defendants.  The Court held that the “alienage of Lacassaign 
constitutes no objection . . . [because] the treaty of 1778, between the United States and 
 
120 15 U.S. 259 (1817). 
121 Id. at 273-74. 
122 1800 Convention with France, supra note 92, art. 7, (“The Citizens, and inhabitants of the United 
States shall be at liberty to dispose by testament, donation, or otherwise, of their goods, moveable, and 
immoveable, holden in the territory of the French Republic in Europe, and the Citizens of the French 
Republic, shall have the same liberty with regard to goods, moveable, and immoveable, holden in the 
territory of the United States, in favor of such persons as they shall think proper.  The Citizens and 
inhabitants of either of the two countries, who shall be heirs of goods, moveable, or immoveable in the 
other shall be able to succeed ab intestato, without being obliged to obtain letters of naturalization, and 
without having the effect of this provision contested or impeded under any pretext whatever.”) 
123 Chirac, 15 U.S. at 275. 
124 23 U.S. 181 (1825). 
125 Id. at 182-86. 
126 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 81, art. 11, at 11-12 (“The Subjects and Inhabitants of the 
said United States . . . may by Testament, Donation, or otherwise dispose of their Goods moveable and 
immoveable in favour of such Persons as to them shall seem good; and their Heirs, Subjects of the Said 
United States, residing whether in France or elsewhere, may succeed them ab intestat, without being 
obliged to obtain Letters of Naturalization, and without having the Effect of this Concession contested or 
impeded under Pretext of any Rights or Prerogatives of Provinces, Cities, or Private Persons.  . . . The 
Subjects of the most Christian King shall enjoy on their Part, in all the Dominions of the said States, an 
entire and perfect Reciprocity relative to the Stipulations contained in the present Article.”) 
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France, secures to the citizens and subjects of either power the privilege of holding lands 
in the territory of the other.”127 
In Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven,128 a British 
corporation brought an action for ejectment against the Town of New Haven.  The 
plaintiff owned the subject property before the Revolutionary War.129 After the War, the 
Vermont legislature passed a law that expropriated the plaintiff and granted its property 
rights in the state “to the respective towns in which such lands lay.”130 In support of its 
suit for ejectment, plaintiff invoked Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, which 
prohibited confiscation of British property in the United States.131 Neither Article 6 nor 
any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiff to enforce the treaty 
in a domestic court.132 Nevertheless, the Court enforced the treaty on behalf of the 
plaintiff.  Referring to the land grant from the Vermont legislature to the Town of New 
Haven, the Court said: “[T]he only question is, whether this grant was not void by force 
of the 6th article of the above treaty?  We think it was.”133 
In Carver v. Jackson,134 plaintiffs who traced their property claims to Roger 
Morris brought an action for ejectment.  The New York legislature had confiscated 
Morris’ property during the Revolutionary War.135 After conclusion of the peace treaty 
with Britain, New York passed laws requiring plaintiffs who sued to regain possession of 
confiscated properties to pay the occupants of those properties for any improvements 
made thereon.136 When plaintiffs sued for ejectment, defendant sought compensation for 
improvements in accordance with New York law.  In reply, plaintiffs contended that state 
laws requiring them to pay compensation for improvements violated Article 6 of the 
Definitive Treaty of Peace.137 Neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the treaty 
specifically empowered the plaintiffs to enforce the treaty in a domestic court.138 
127 Carneal, 23 U.S. at 189. 
128 21 U.S. 464 (1823). 
129 Id. at 465-66. 
130 Id. at 466. 
131 Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 6, at 155 (“[T]here shall be no future Confiscations 
made nor any Prosecutions commenc’d against any Person or Persons for or by Reason of the Part, which 
he or they may have taken in the present War, and that no Person shall on that Account suffer any future 
Loss or Damage, either in his Person Liberty or Property.”) 
132 Article 5 of the treaty created a private right of action for British subjects whose land was 
confiscated before entry into force of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.  See supra notes 69-72 and 
accompanying text.  Article 5 did not apply in this case, though, because the treaty took effect in 1783, and 
the confiscation in this case did not occur until 1794.  Thus, this case was governed by Article 6, which 
addressed future confiscations.  Article 6 did not create a private right of action. 
133 Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel, 21 U.S. at 490-91. 
134 29 U.S. 1 (1830). 
135 Id. at 4. 
136 Id. at 99-100. 
137 Id. at 54, 65-66. 
138 The Court’s opinion cites both Articles 5 and 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.  See id. at 99-
101.  Article 5 was retrospective, addressing confiscation of British property before entry into force of the 
treaty; Article 6 was prospective, addressing future confiscations.  See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra 
note 71.  The point at issue in Carver was whether New York could enforce laws enacted in 1784 and 
1786, after entry into force of the peace treaty, that would have required plaintiffs to pay for improvements 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding 
“that the claim for improvements in this case, is inconsistent with the treaty of peace, and 
ought to be rejected.”139 
In Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co.,140 a British prize court condemned a 
U.S. ship.  The ship owner sued the insurance company for breach of contract because the 
insurer refused to issue payment on the policy.141 The company claimed that the 
judgment of the British court terminated its contractual obligation under the policy.  The 
Supreme Court, though, ruled in favor of the ship owner on the grounds that the capture 
and condemnation of the ship violated article 18 of the Jay Treaty.142 Article 18 created a 
duty for British naval vessels not to detain American ships.143 The treaty, however, did 
not explicitly empower ship owners to bring suit in U.S. courts for violations of article 
18.  Nor was there any federal statute that authorized private enforcement of the treaty.  
Nevertheless, the Court awarded a remedy to the individual plaintiff whose treaty rights 
were violated.144 
In all five cases, the Court applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of 
judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights.  In every case, the Court 
enforced the treaty on behalf of the party invoking the treaty, even though there was no 
statutory or treaty provision that expressly empowered individual litigants to enforce the 
treaty.  All five cases, therefore, are inconsistent with the Bork model.  From the 
standpoint of Justice Marshall and his contemporaries, though, the absence of an express 
private right of action was not a bar to judicial enforcement because, in their view, every 
treaty provision that protects individual rights empowers the right-holder to invoke the 
treaty before a U.S. court. 
 
4.   Cases in Which It is Unclear Whether the Treaty Created a Private Right of 
Action: The previous section analyzed cases where the Court enforced a treaty on behalf 
of an individual litigant, despite the fact that there was no statutory or treaty provision 
granting that individual a private cause of action.  Those cases are patently inconsistent 
with the Bork model.  This section analyzes cases where the Court enforced a treaty on 
behalf of an individual litigant, there was no statutory right of action, and it is debatable 
whether the treaty at issue created a private right of action.  If one construes the Borkian 
requirement for a right of action strictly, insisting on express treaty language that 
 
made by defendants.  See Carver, 29 U.S. at 99-100.  The Court held that state laws requiring plaintiffs to 
pay for improvements constituted a “confiscation” of their estate, in violation of Article 6.  Id. at 101.  
Thus, although Article 5 created a private right of action for claims involving confiscation of property 
before entry into force of the peace treaty, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text, that right of 
action did not apply to the specific claim at issue in Carver.
139 Carver, 29 U.S. at 101. 
140 8 US 185 (1808). 
141 Id. at 197. 
142 See Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 18, at 258-59. 
143 Id., art. 18 (“And whereas it frequently happens that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to an 
enemy, without knowing that the same is . . . blockaded . . . it is agreed that every vessel so circumstanced 
may be turned away from such port or place, but she shall not be detained . . . . unless after notice she shall 
again attempt to enter.”) 
144 Fitzsimmons, 8 U.S. at 197-202. 
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empowers individual litigants to enforce the treaty, then these cases are also inconsistent 
with the Bork model.  If one construes the right of action requirement less rigidly, 
permitting implied rights of action in some cases, then these cases are arguably consistent 
with the Bork model. 
 
Before analyzing these cases, two points merit attention.  First, in none of the 
cases under consideration here did the Court specifically address, separate from the 
merits of the case, the question whether the treaty created a private right of action.  In the 
jurisprudence of the early nineteenth century, the Court simply assumed that every 
individual litigant whose treaty-based rights were violated had the power to enforce those 
rights in a domestic court.  Second, while it is possible to analyze these cases in a manner 
that is consistent with the Bork model by construing the Borkian right of action 
requirement liberally, that analysis is in tension with many of the modern cases applying 
the Bork model, where courts have construed the right of action requirement quite 
strictly. 
 
During the period under study, the Supreme Court decided six cases in which it 
awarded judgment to individual litigants whose rights were protected under Article 9 of 
the Jay Treaty, including two cases where plaintiffs prevailed in their treaty-based 
claims,145 and four cases where defendants won treaty-based defenses.146 In none of 
these cases was there a federal statute empowering individual litigants to enforce Article 
9 in a U.S. court.  Thus, every case would have been decided differently under the Bork 
model, unless the treaty itself creates a private right of action.  Whether it does is a close 
question. 
 
Article 9 states as follows: 
 
It is agreed, that British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of 
the United States, and American Citizens who now hold Lands in the 
Dominions of His Majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the 
nature and Tenure of their respective Estates and Titles therein, and may 
grant Sell or Devise the same to whom they please, in like manner as if 
 
145 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489 (1824) (ordering foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property to 
secure individual property right protected by article 9 of Jay Treaty); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. 594 (1818) 
(ordering defendants to convey land to plaintiff because defendants had wrongfully appropriated land in 
violation of article 9 of Jay Treaty). 
146 Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830) (where plaintiffs brought equitable action, asserting 
entitlement to defendants’ share of proceeds from sale of land, Court held that article 9 of Jay Treaty 
protected defendants’ right to half of proceeds from sale); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. 453 (1819) (where 
plaintiff sued to rescind contract for purchase of land, challenging validity of defendant’s title, Court 
dismissed bill for rescission because defendant had valid title protected by article 6 of Definitive Treaty of 
Peace and article 9 of Jay Treaty); Jackson v. Clarke, 16 U.S. 1 (1818) (where plaintiff sued for ejectment, 
Court dismissed suit because article 9 of Jay Treaty protected rights of British citizens to hold and inherit 
land); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1812) (where plaintiff sued for ejectment, Court 
dismissed suit because defendant’s title to land was secured by article 9 of Jay Treaty).  For additional 
analysis of these cases, see GEORGE LEE HASKINS AND HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 554-57 (1981) (volume 2 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States).    
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they were Natives; and that neither they nor their Heirs or assigns shall, so 
far as may respect the said Lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto,
be regarded as Aliens.147 
If the treaty drafters had not included the italicized phrase, Article 9 would clearly not 
satisfy the Borkian requirement for a private cause of action.  Advocates of the Bork 
model could reasonably argue, though, that the decisions enforcing Article 9 on behalf of 
individual litigants are consistent with the Bork model because the italicized phrase 
empowers individual litigants to enforce Article 9 in a domestic court.  In support of this 
argument, they could cite the Supreme Court’s statement that “the remedies, as well as 
the rights, of these aliens, are completely protected by the treaty of 1794.”148 
On the other hand, the phrasing of article 9 suggests that the treaty drafters, like 
the courts of that era, were working against the background assumption that “where there 
is a right, there is a remedy.”  That widely shared background assumption may explain 
why the treaty drafters described the legal remedies as being “incident to” estates and 
titles in land.  Under this Marshallian view, the treaty itself protects titles in land (a 
primary right), and the associated legal remedies are “incident to” those titles. 
 
Assume, hypothetically, that the New York legislature passed a law abolishing the 
traditional action for ejectment, and requiring individuals to petition the Governor, 
instead of filing suit in court, whenever they wanted to assert claims to land occupied by 
someone else.  If the law applied equally to citizens and aliens, there would be no 
violation of the Jay Treaty.149 Therefore, article 9 of the Jay Treaty does not actually 
empower British citizens to enforce the treaty in U.S. courts – that is, it does not create a 
private right of action.  It merely prevents discrimination against British citizens who 
hold title to property in the United States, ensuring that they have equal access to the 
remedies that U.S. law provides for U.S. citizens.  If this view is correct, then the six 
 
147 Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 9 (emphasis added). 
148 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. 489, 496 (1824). 
149 The Court’s decision in Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 
(1830), supports this point.  The plaintiff was a British corporation that owned land in Vermont before the 
Revolutionary War.  See id. at 500-02.  In 1794, many years after the war ended, the Vermont legislature 
confiscated plaintiff’s property in Vermont.  By operation of state law, the land at issue passed to the Town 
of Pawlet, which then rented the subject property to Ozias Clarke, who retained possession and occupancy 
until plaintiff sued for ejectment.  Id. at 481-84.  The Vermont law confiscating plaintiff’s property was a 
clear violation of Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, and of Article 9 of the Jay Treaty.  See 
Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 6 (prohibiting future confiscation of British property after 
1783); Jay Treaty, supra note 113, art. 9 (protecting the rights of British nationals who held land in the 
United States).  Plaintiff sought two distinct remedies for the violation of its treaty rights: recovery of the 
land, and collection of mesne profits.  The traditional common law action for ejectment carried with it a 
remedial right to recover mesne profits.  See id. at 489, 508.  Vermont, though, had enacted statutes that 
superseded the common law and barred recovery of mesne profits by plaintiffs in ejectment actions.  Id. at 
509.  Defendants, therefore, contested plaintiff’s claim for mesne profits.  The Court ruled in favor of the 
defendants on this point.  Justice Story, writing for the Court, said that Vermont had “prescribed the 
restrictions upon which mesne profits shall be recovered; and these restrictions are obligatory upon the 
citizens of the state.  The plaintiffs have not, in this particular, any privileges by treaty beyond those of 
citizens.”  Id. at 509-10.  Since the law restricting mesne profits applied equally to citizens and aliens, 
Vermont could apply the law to British plaintiffs without violating their treaty rights. 
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cases in which the Supreme Court awarded individual remedies for violations of Article 9 
are inconsistent with the Bork model. 
 
B. Cases Where the Court Did not Reach the Merits of a Treaty-Based 
Claim or Defense 
In United States v. Judge Lawrence,150 the Attorney General petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, invoking Article 9 of a consular treaty with 
France,151 and seeking to compel the district judge to issue a warrant for extradition of an 
alleged deserter.152 The Attorney General asserted that the district judge had violated the 
treaty by refusing to issue a warrant.153 The Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits 
of the government’s treaty claim, holding unanimously “that a mandamus ought not to 
issue” because the judge had acted within the scope of his discretion.154 Judge Lawrence 
is consistent with the Bork model because the party invoking the treaty did not obtain the 
remedy sought.155 The case is also consistent with the Marshall model, though, because 
the district court held that the United States did not have a duty to extradite the fugitive 
(hence, France had no right to compel his extradition), and the Supreme Court did not 
disturb that ruling. 
 
In addition to Judge Lawrence, the Supreme Court decided six other treaty cases 
between 1789 and 1838 in which it declined to reach the merits of a treaty-based claim or 
defense.  The Court dismissed three of those cases for lack of jurisdiction.156 In three 
other cases, the Court concluded that it lacked sufficient information to decide the merits 
 
150 3 U.S. 42 (1795). 
151 Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice Consuls, 
Nov. 14, 1788, art. 9, U.S.-France, reprinted in 2 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States 
of America 228, 237-38 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931) [hereinafter, “Consular Convention”].    
152 Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. at 42-44.  Initially, the French Vice Consul filed suit in the district court, 
seeking a warrant for extradition of Captain Barre.  Id. at 42-43.  The district judge refused to issue the 
warrant on the grounds that the Vice Consul failed to provide the proof required by the treaty.  See id. at 
43-44.  The case counts as a case in which an individual litigant raised a treaty-based claim because the 
Vice Consul asserted, on behalf of France, a right to have the deserter extradited. 
153 Id. at 48-53.  Interestingly, in support of the government’s argument for a writ of mandamus, the 
Attorney General stated: “The general principle of issuing that writ, is founded on the necessity of 
affording a competent remedy for every right.”  Id. at 52.  Thus, in the late 18th century, even the Attorney 
General apparently endorsed the Marshall model. 
154 Id. at 53. 
155 At the district court level, the French Vice Consul failed to obtain a warrant for extradition, which 
was the remedy he sought.  At the Supreme Court level, the Attorney General  failed to obtain a writ of 
mandamus, which was the remedy he sought. 
156 Keene v. Clark’s Heirs, 35 U.S. 291 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed that he was evicted from land, 
and that his title was protected by treaty, Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because state court had 
decided case on the basis of state law); New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 236 (1835) (where 
individual plaintiffs sued City of New Orleans, asserting title to property in the city, and City raised defense 
based on Louisiana Treaty, Court held that “[t]he case involves no principle on which this court could take 
jurisdiction”); Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344 (1809) (where defendant raised defense based on 
article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, Court dismissed case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that case 
did not “arise under” a treaty). 
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of the treaty claim.157 All seven cases in which the Court did not reach the merits of a 
treaty-based claim or defense are consistent with the Bork model because, in each case, 
the Court declined to enforce the treaty on behalf of an individual litigant.  However, 
none of these cases endorse the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of 
treaties.  In each case, the Court’s rationale for refusing to reach the merits is a rationale 
that applies equally to constitutional, statutory and common law claims.  In no case did 
the Court decline to reach the merits because the treaty was not “judicially enforceable,” 
or because the treaty did not create a private right of action.  Thus, all seven cases in this 
category are consistent with the Marshall model. 
 
C. Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Lost on the Merits 
 
Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided 13 cases in which it ruled 
that a treaty did not protect the right asserted by the individual invoking the treaty.158 
157 Soulard v. U.S., 29 U.S. 511, 513 (1830) (where plaintiffs asserted rights to land in Missouri, 
claiming title based on Spanish grants protected by the Louisiana Treaty, Court determined that it was 
“unable to form a judment which would be satisfactory” and decided “to hold the cases . . . under 
advisement”); The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. 52 (1819) (where Spanish consul sought restoration of captured 
vessel to Spanish shipowners, alleging that capture violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court remanded 
case to circuit court for further proceedings); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. 300 (1816) (where British plaintiff 
raised claim based on Article 9 of Jay Treaty, Court remanded  case to circuit court for additional 
factfinding). 
158 See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838) (where plaintiff sued to eject defendant from land in 
Louisiana, asserting rights under 1819 treaty whereby U.S. acquired Florida from Spain, Court held that 
plaintiff had no rights under that treaty because U.S. had acquired subject land from France as part of 
Louisiana purchase in 1803); U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838) (where plaintiff asserted title to land in 
Florida protected by article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, Court held that he never acquired title from Spain 
because he failed to perform condition precedent that was required in order to obtain title by virtue of 
Spanish grant); U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838) (where plaintiff asserted title to land in Florida 
protected by article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, Court rejected claim because he failed to perform condition 
required by express terms of Spanish grant); Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed 
title to land in Missouri protected by article 3 of Treaty for Cession of Louisiana, Court rejected claim 
because Spanish “grant” merely gave him option to select land, and option expired because he failed to 
exercise option before March 1804); Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 
(1830) (where British corporation asserted right to recover mesne profits for confiscated land, Court held 
that neither the Jay Treaty nor the Definitive Treaty of Peace granted plaintiff right to recover mesne 
profits); Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193 (1828) (where claims commission established by treaty awarded 
payment to assignees from U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, bankrupt person sued assignees to recover funds, 
and assignees invoked judgment of treaty-based claims commission as a defense, Court held that  
Commission’s judgment did not bar suit because Commission’s authority under treaty extended only to 
claims by U.S. citizens against Spain, but not to disputes between U.S. citizens); Blight’s Lessee v. 
Rochester, 20 U.S. 535 (1822) (where plaintiffs asserted title to land in Kentucky by descent from James 
Dunlap, a British subject, Court held that Dunlap’s title was not protected by either the Jay Treaty or the 
Definitive Treaty of Peace, because he acquired title after the peace treaty took effect and died before 
signature of the Jay Treaty); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821) (in a dispute between a U.S. captor 
and a Spanish claimant who invoked article XVII of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, the Court ruled in favor of 
the U.S. captor, holding that “the immunity . . . intended by that article [XVII] never took effect”); The 
Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819) (ruling in favor of captor and rejecting claim of Spanish 
ship owner, who invoked the 1795 Treaty with Spain, because the treaty did not protect the subject goods 
from capture); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) (where American privateer captured enemy vessel with 
neutral cargo, and asserted a right to seize the cargo under article 15 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court 
held that the law of nations protects neutral cargo from capture, and the treaty did not alter the law of 
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The results of all 13 cases are consistent with the Bork model because the party invoking 
the treaty did not obtain a remedy.  They are also consistent, however, with the 
Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies.  That presumption applies only in 
cases where an individual establishes that his or her treaty rights have been violated.  In 
each of these 13 cases, the presumption did not apply because the Court decided that the 
treaty did not protect the right asserted by the individual invoking the treaty. 
 
It bears emphasis that none of the 13 cases cited above endorse the Borkian 
presumption against private enforcement of treaties.  None of the cases denied relief on 
the grounds that the treaty at issue did not create a private right of action.159 Moreover, 
none of the cases denied relief on the grounds that the treaty at issue was not judicially 
enforceable.  Indeed, all 13 cases involved treaties that the Court did enforce on behalf of 
individual litigants in other cases.160 Therefore, these 13 cases provide no support for the 
 
nations in that respect); Smith v. State of Maryland, 10 U.S. 286 (1810) (where defendant held land in trust 
for British subject that Maryland confiscated in 1780, Court held that confiscation did not violate Article 6 
of the Definitive Treaty of Peace because Maryland confiscated the land before the treaty took effect); 
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. 285 (1796) (where French captors of Dutch ship invoked article 17 of the 1778 
Treaty with France as a bar to jurisdiction of U.S. courts, Court rejected treaty-based jurisdictional 
argument but ruled in favor of French captors on the merits); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 
(1794) (where French privateer contended that article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France barred the district 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a prize case, Court ruled that the treaty did not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction, and instructed the court to decide whether “restitution can be made consistently with the laws 
of nations and the treaties and laws of the United States”). 
159 In two of the cases, the party invoking the treaty had an express private right of action under 
article 20 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain.  See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821); The Nuestra Senora 
de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819).  See also supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing other 
cases involving article 20 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain).  In three of the cases, the party invoking the 
treaty had an express private right of action under federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida or Missouri.  
See U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838) (land in Florida); U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838) (land 
in Florida); Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836) (land in Missouri).  See also supra notes 57-67 and 
accompanying text (discussing federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida and Missouri). 
160 Smith v. U.S., 35 U.S. 326 (1836), involved Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty, which the Court 
enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in three other cases.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text 
(discussing those three cases).  Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511 (1838), U.S. v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. 476 (1838), 
and U.S. v. Mills’ Heirs, 37 U.S. 215 (1838), all involved Article 8 of the Florida Treaty, which the Court 
enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in nine other cases.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text 
(discussing those nine cases).  Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193 (1828), involved Articles 9 and 11 of the 
Florida Treaty.  The Court did not decide any other cases during this period implicating those specific 
treaty provisions. 
 Soc’y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. 480 (1830), Blight’s Lessee v. 
Rochester, 20 U.S. 535 (1822), and Smith v. State of Maryland, 10 U.S. 286 (1810) all involved Article 9 of 
the Jay Treaty, or Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, or both.  The Court enforced Article 9 of the 
Jay Treaty on behalf of individual litigants in six other cases during this period.  See supra notes 145-49 
and accompanying text.  The Court enforced Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace on behalf of 
individual litigants in two other cases.  See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text. 
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1 (1821), The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. 497 (1819), 
and The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) all involved the 1795 Treaty with Spain.  The Court enforced that 
treaty on behalf of individual litigants in two other cases: The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. 152 (1821), and The 
Pizarro, 15 U.S. 227 (1817).  Both The Nereide (where the party invoking the treaty lost) and The Pizarro 
(where the party invoking the treaty won) involved article 15 of that treaty.  The Nuestra Senora de la 
Caridad does not say which specific article is implicated.   The Amiable Isabella involved article 17 of the 
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Bork model.  In fact, these cases tend to support the Marshall model, because the Court 
generally applied a Marshallian “rights-focused methodology,” not a Borkian “remedies-
focused” methodology.  
 
In addition to the 13 cases cited above, the Supreme Court decided three other 
cases during this period in which the party invoking the treaty lost on the merits of a 
treaty-based claim or defense: Strother v. Lucas,161 De la Croix v. Chamberlain,162 and 
Foster v. Neilson.163 These three cases illustrate limits to the Marshallian principle that 
“where there is a right, there is a remedy.” The remainder of this section analyzes 
Strother and De la Croix. Section D below addresses Foster.
Both Strother and De la Croix were ejectment actions.  In both cases, the plaintiff 
claimed title to land as the successor to a person who acquired an interest in the subject 
property when the territory was under Spanish control.164 In both cases, the plaintiff’s 
property rights were protected by treaty: Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty in Strother;165 
and Article 8 of the Florida Treaty in De la Croix.166 Congress had enacted a series of 
statutes creating boards of commissioners with authority to entertain claims by 
individuals who asserted property rights protected by the Louisiana or Florida Treaty.  
The statutes directed individuals to present their claims to the relevant board, and granted 
the boards authority to confirm titles to land in territory subject to their respective 
jurisdictions.167 In De la Croix, the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest failed to 
present a claim to the relevant board of commissioners;168 in Strother, plaintiff’s 
predecessor failed to do so in a timely fashion.169 In each case, the plaintiff’s failure to 
 
treaty.  The Court did not decide any other cases during this period implicating that specific treaty 
provision. 
Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. 285 (1796) and Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. 6, 16 (1794) both 
involved article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France.  The Court enforced other provisions of the same treaty 
on behalf of individual litigants in Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. 319 (1796) and Carneal v. 
Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825).  See supra notes 80-83 and 124-27 and accompanying text.  There were no 
Supreme Court cases during this period where the Court enforced article 17 on behalf of individual 
litigants.  There were, however, decisions by lower federal courts enforcing article 17.  See, e.g., Moodie v. 
The Amity, 17 F.Cas. 650 (D.S.C. (1796) (holding that article 17 of 1778 Treaty with France precluded 
district court from exercising jurisdiction in prize case where French vessel captured ship outside the 
jurisdictional limits of the United States). 
161 37 U.S. 410 (1838). 
162 25 U.S. 599 (1827). 
163 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
164 See Strother, 37 U.S. at 430-32; De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 599-600. 
165 See Strother, 37 U.S. at 435-40.  See also Louisiana Treaty, supra note 57, art. 3. 
166 See De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02.  See also Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8. 
167 See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.  
168 See De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02 (“It does not appear that this order of survey has ever been 
recorded or passed upon by the board of commissioners, or register of the land office, established by 
Congress in the district in which the land lies.”). 
169 See Strother, 37 U.S. at 453-54.  In Strother, the plaintiff’s predecessor did file a claim with the 
recorder of land titles in 1815.  See id. However, defendant’s predecessor had filed a claim with the board 
of commissioners in 1806, which the board had confirmed in 1809-10.  Id. at 433.  Plaintiff’s predecessor, 
therefore, filed her claim several years too late. 
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present his claim to the relevant board of commissioners was a key element of the 
Court’s rationale for awarding judgment to the defendant.170 
Therefore, Strother and De la Croix signify that in cases where Congress has 
established a domestic remedial mechanism enabling individuals to enforce their treaty-
based rights, individuals who fail to utilize the congressionally established mechanism 
may ultimately lose the ability to enforce their rights.  Both cases are consistent with the 
Marshall model because the Marshall model recognizes that Congress has the power to 
enact legislation that restricts the availability of domestic judicial remedies for 
individuals who have treaty-protected rights.  Both cases are also consistent with the 
Bork model, inasmuch as the Court denied remedies in both cases for plaintiffs whose 
rights were protected by treaties.  Neither case, however, endorses the Borkian 
presumption against private enforcement of treaties.  In neither case did the Court deny 
relief on the grounds that the treaty at issue did not create a private right of action, or on 
the grounds that the treaty was not judicially enforceable. 
 
D. Foster and Its Progeny 
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork cited Foster v. Neilson171 for 
the proposition that treaties “do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable 
in courts.”172 In recent cases involving both the VCCR and the POW Convention, state 
courts and lower federal courts have also cited Foster for similar propositions.173 
Indeed, virtually every modern case that endorses the Borkian presumption against 
judicial enforcement of treaties cites Foster as authority, or cites some other case that 
cites Foster as authority.  In particular, the modern cases cite that portion of the Foster 
opinion that has come to be associated with the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.174 
But insofar as the Bork model relies on Foster’s non-self-execution holding,175 it is a 
 
170 See id. at 453-54; De la Croix, 25 U.S. at 601-02. 
171 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
172 726 F.2d 774, 808 (Bork, J., concurring). 
173 See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (in a case raising claims 
under the POW Convention, citing Foster as authority for the proposition that “[t]reaties do not generally 
create rights privately enforceable in the courts”); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2000) (in 
a case raising claims under the VCCR, citing Foster as authority for the proposition that “treaties do not 
generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts”). 
174 The so-called doctrine of non-self-executing treaties is actually four distinct doctrines.  See Sloss, 
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 12-18 (2002) (summarizing four doctrines).  See also Carlos 
M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695 (1995) (presenting a 
different four-fold classification).  The two versions of the doctrine that emerged in the twentieth century 
are radically different, in important respects, from the two nineteenth century versions of the doctrine.  See 
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, at 12-18.  Thus, the “non-self-execution” portion of Foster bears very 
little relationship to the modern doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.  
175 Foster never used the terms “self-executing” or “non-self-executing.”  Justice Marshall’s 
contemporaries used the terms “executory” and “executed” to describe what is now commonly referred to 
as Foster’s non-self-execution holding.  See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 746-47 
(1838).  It was not until 1887, in the case of Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887), that the Court 
first used the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” to describe Foster‘s distinction between 
executory and executed treaty provisions.  Nevertheless, in accordance with modern terminology, this 
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model erected on a foundation of sand.  This is true for three reasons.  First, the non-self-
execution portion of Foster is properly viewed as a concurring opinion, because the 
majority in Foster would have decided the case on other grounds.176 Second, the Court 
overruled the non-self-execution portion of Foster four years after it decided the case.177 
Third, Foster says nothing about private rights of action, and it did not endorse a 
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. 
 
This section demonstrates that Foster provides no support for the Bork model.  
The analysis is divided into five sub-sections.  The first sub-section provides historical 
background.  Next, the article discusses the “political question” holding in Foster. Then, 
the article addresses the territorial application of Article 8 of the Florida Treaty.  The last 
two sub-sections examine the “non-self-execution” holding in Foster, and address the 
relationship between Foster and the Bork model. 
 
1.  Historical Background: The land at issue in Foster is situated within an area 
that is bounded on the North by the 31st parallel, on the West by the Mississippi River 
and on the East by the Perdido River.178 In terms of contemporary geography, this area 
includes the southernmost portions of Alabama and Mississippi, and parts of southeastern 
Louisiana (not including New Orleans).  This article will refer to the area as “Floriana.”  
In the early nineteenth century, there was a dispute between the United States and Spain 
as to whether Floriana was part of Florida, which Spain owned at that time, or Louisiana, 
which the United States owned. 
 
As of 1760, Louisiana was French territory and Florida was Spanish territory.  
The Perdido River was the accepted boundary between Louisiana and Florida.179 
Floriana, therefore, was part of Louisiana.  In 1763, Great Britain, France and Spain 
signed the treaty of Paris.  By that treaty, Great Britain acquired Florida from Spain.  
Great Britain also acquired from France that portion of Louisiana that lay east of the 
Mississippi River, except for New Orleans and the island on which it is situated.180 In a 
separate, secret treaty concluded at about the same time, France ceded the residue of 
Louisiana to Spain.181 The King of England then divided his newly acquired territory 
into two provinces, which were labeled East and West Florida.  By a royal proclamation 
issued in 1763, he established the 31st parallel as the northern border of the two 
Floridas.182 At that time, Floriana became part of West Florida. 
 
article will use the term “non-self-execution” to refer to the relevant portion of Marshall’s opinion in 
Foster.
176 See infra notes 203-212 and accompanying text. 
177 See U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 88-89 (1833) (expressly overruling Foster’s non-self-
execution holding).   See also U.S. v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691 (1832) (overruling Foster sub silentio). 
178 The Perdido River currently forms the western boundary of Florida that separates the Florida 
panhandle from Alabama.  
179 Foster, 27 U.S. at 300. 
180 Id. at 300-01. 
181 Id.
182 Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. 523, 524 (1827).  The 31st parallel now forms the border between the 
Florida panhandle and that portion of Southern Alabama that lies east of the Perdido River.  The 31st 
parallel also forms part of the border between Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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The United States declared its independence from Britain in 1776.  During the 
Revolutionary War, Spain conquered Florida, reclaiming the land from Britain.183 In 
September 1783, Great Britain signed peace treaties with both the United States and 
Spain.  In the treaty with Spain, Britain ceded East and West Florida (including Floriana) 
to Spain,184 but that treaty did not specify the boundaries of Florida.  The treaty between 
Britain and the United States established the Mississippi River as the western boundary 
of the United States, and the 31st parallel as the southern boundary separating the U.S. 
from Florida.185 Neither treaty established a boundary between Louisiana and Florida, 
but the issue was unimportant at that time because Spain owned both territories, having 
acquired Louisiana from France in 1763 and Florida from Britain in 1783. 
 
In 1800, France and Spain concluded the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, in which Spain 
agreed “to retrocede to the French republic . . .  the colony or province of Louisiana, with 
the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France 
possessed it.”186 This language was deeply ambiguous.  The province of Louisiana 
“when France possessed it,” prior to 1763, included Floriana – i.e., the land east of the 
Mississippi, west of the Perdido, and south of the 31st parallel.  But Britain had 
incorporated Floriana into Florida in 1763, and Spain had acquired Floriana (along with 
the rest of Florida) from Britain in 1783.  Thus, Spain insisted that when it ceded 
Louisiana to France “with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain,” Floriana 
was not included as part of Louisiana.187 
In the Louisiana Purchase agreement concluded in 1803, the United States 
acquired Louisiana from France.  That treaty, however, merely referred back to the 
Treaty of St. Ildefonso to define the boundaries of Louisiana.188 Beginning in 1803, 
Congress passed a series of acts to establish U.S. control over Louisiana.  Congressional 
actions left no doubt that Congress believed the U.S. had acquired Floriana from France 
as part of the Louisiana Purchase.189 Congress, therefore, asserted U.S. sovereignty over 
Floriana.  Meanwhile, though, Spain continued to assert Spanish sovereignty over 
Floriana, claiming the territory as part of Florida.  The United States and Spain did not 
finally resolve this political dispute until Spain ceded Florida to the United States in the 
Florida Treaty in 1819.190 In the interim, though, between 1803 and 1819, Spain had 
granted land in Floriana to various Spanish grantees.   
 
2.   The “Political Question” Holding in Foster: Foster involved a dispute over 
title to land east of the Mississippi River, and south of the 31st parallel, in what is now 
southeastern Louisiana.  The plaintiffs traced their title to an 1804 land grant from the 
Spanish governor of Florida.191 In response to their petition, defendant alleged that, prior 
 
183 Henderson v. Poindexter’s Lessee, 25 U.S. 530, 534 (1827). 
184 Foster, 27 U.S. at 301. 
185 See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 71, art. 2. 
186 Foster, 27 U.S. at 301 (quoting Treaty of St. Ildefonso). 
187 See id. at 302-03. 
188 See Louisiana Treaty, supra note 57, art. I. 
189 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 303-09. 
190 See Florida Treaty, supra note 63, arts. 2 and 3. 
191 See Foster, at 253-55.  
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to the 1804 grant, the land had been “ceded by Spain to France, and by France to the 
United States; and the officer making said grant had not then and there any right [to grant 
the land], and the said grant is wholly null and void.”192 Thus, the first question 
presented in Foster was whether the 1804 Spanish land grant was valid.  The resolution 
of that question, in turn, hinged on the issue whether the U.S. had acquired the land from 
France in 1803 as part of the Louisiana purchase: the very issue that had been the subject 
of a political dispute between the U.S. and Spain from 1803 to 1819.  
 
The Court noted that the language of the relevant treaties – the Louisiana Treaty 
and the Treaty of St. Ildefonso – could plausibly be interpreted to support either the 
Spanish position (that the land at issue was part of Spanish Florida in 1804), or the U.S. 
position (that it was part of the United States in 1804).193 In this context, Marshall stated: 
 
In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary, it is 
scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by the 
measures adopted by its own government.  There being no common 
tribunal to decide between them, each determines for itself on its own 
rights, and if they cannot adjust their differences peaceably, the right 
remains with the strongest.  The judiciary is not that department of the 
government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers 
is confided . . . it is the province of the Court to conform its decisions to 
the will of the legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed.194 
In short, the Court’s initial holding in Foster was “that the question of boundary 
between the United States and Spain, was a question for the political departments of the 
government.”195 Since Congress had enacted numerous statutes asserting U.S. 
sovereignty over Floriana,196 the Court accepted the U.S. view that the United States had 
acquired the subject property when it purchased Louisiana in 1803.197 This meant that 
the plaintiffs could not establish a valid title on the basis of the 1804 Spanish grant, 
because the Spanish governor had no authority to grant land in U.S. territory. 
 
The Court did not decide another case involving land in Floriana until it decided 
Garcia v. Lee in 1838,198 nine years after its decision in Foster.199 By that time, Roger 
Taney was Chief Justice, Marshall having died in the interim.  In Garcia, Taney 
reaffirmed Foster’s political question holding, stating “that the boundary line determined 
 
192 Id. at 255. 
193 Id. at 306-07. 
194 Id. at 307. 
195 Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. 511, 516 (1838) (restating the holding of Foster).  See also Delacroix v. 
Chamberlain, 25 U.S. 599, 600 (1827) (foreshadowing Foster’s political question holding in the following 
terms: “A question of disputed boundary between two sovereign independent nations is, indeed, much more 
properly a subject for diplomatic discussion . . . than of judicial investigation.”). 
196 See Foster, 27 U.S., at 303-09. 
197 Id. at 307-09. 
198 37 U.S. 511 (1838). 
199 Keene v. Clark’s Heirs, 35 U.S. 291 (1836), involved land in Floriana, but the Court dismissed the 
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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on as the true one by the political departments of the government, must be recognised as 
the true one by the judicial department.”200 Indeed, Taney characterized this holding as 
the “leading principle” of the Court’s decision in Foster. Clearly, Foster’s “leading 
principle” has no application to modern treaty cases, because the principle, in Marshall’s 
own words, applies only to cases involving “a controversy between two nations 
concerning national boundary.”201 In State v. Sanchez-Llamas, though, one of the cases 
now pending before the Supreme Court, the Oregon Supreme Court cited Foster’s 
political question holding in support of its view that the VCCR is not judicially 
enforceable.202 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court conflated the distinction between 
Foster’s political question holding, which applies only to disputes concerning national 
boundaries, and Foster’s non-self-execution holding, which has potentially broader 
application. 
 
3.   The Territorial Application of Article 8: Having held that the plaintiffs could 
not establish a valid title on the basis of the 1804 Spanish land grant, the Court in Foster 
next considered whether the plaintiffs could establish a valid title on the basis of article 8 
of the Florida Treaty.203 In Article 8, the U.S. promised to honor “[a]ll the grants of land 
made before the 24th of January 1818 by [Spain] . . . in the said Territories ceded by His 
Majesty to the United States.”204 This phraseology left open the question whether 
Floriana was part of the territory “ceded by His Majesty to the United States,” within the 
meaning of Article 8.  The Justices disagreed among themselves on that question.  
Marshall and one other Justice thought that the United States had a duty under Article 8 
to protect the interests of individuals, such as the Foster plaintiffs, who received Spanish 
land grants in Floriana before January 1818.205 Marshall conceded, though, that “[t]he 
majority of the Court . . . think differently.”206 The majority view was that the U.S. duty 
under Article 8 to protect the property rights of Spanish grantees applied only to grantees 
of land in Florida proper, not to grantees of land in Floriana.207 
If Marshall had concurred with the majority view that Article 8 did not apply to 
land in Floriana, it would never have been necessary for the Foster court to decide 
whether Article 8 was self-executing.  The Court could have resolved the case on the 
grounds that: 1) the plaintiffs’ grant from Spain was void ab initio (the Court’s 
unanimous “political question” holding); and 2) plaintiffs had no rights under the treaty 
because Article 8 did not apply to the land at issue (the majority view on the territorial 
application question).  Indeed, the Court decided Garcia v. Lee,208 the next case involving 
 
200 Garcia, 37 U.S. at 520. 
201 Foster, at 307. 
202 See Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005). 
203 See Foster, 27 U.S., at 310-14.   
204 Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8.   
205 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 312-13 (stating that “[o]ne other judge and myself are inclined to adopt” the 
view that Article 8 applied to the Spanish grants in Floriana). 
206 Id. at 313. 
207 See id. at 310-14. 
208 37 U.S. 511 (1838). 
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land in Floriana, on precisely these grounds.  Moreover, Chief Justice Taney, writing for 
the majority in Garcia, stated that the Court had decided Foster on these grounds!209 
Thus, from the perspective of Chief Justice Taney, writing nine years after Foster,
Marshall’s discussion of non-self-execution in Foster was pure dicta, unrelated to the 
central holdings of the case.  In a very important sense, Taney was right.  If the Foster 
Court had followed modern practice, wherein different justices write separate opinions, a 
different judge would have written the majority opinion, holding that Article 8 did not 
apply to land in Floriana, and Marshall would have written a separate concurrence setting 
forth his view that Article 8 was executory (not self-executing).  But Marshall exercised 
tight discipline over “his” court, so judges rarely wrote separate opinions in the Marshall 
era.210 Thus, Marshall’s opinion for the Court presented the majority view,211 and then 
presented his alternative non-self-execution rationale that yielded the same result.212 
Modern scholars have failed to recognize that the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties 
has been constructed on the basis of a portion of Marshall’s opinion that was an 
alternative rationale supporting a conclusion that the majority reached on other grounds.  
Worse yet, as the next section shows, modern cases relying on Foster have misinterpreted 
Marshall’s rationale, and have discounted the fact that the Court itself rejected that 
rationale four years after it decided Foster.
4.   The “Non-self-execution” Holding in Foster: Since Marshall disagreed with 
the majority about the territorial application of Article 8, he had two choices.  He could 
dissent from the majority view, or he could devise an alternative rationale supporting the 
majority’s conclusion that Article 8 did not grant plaintiffs title to the disputed property.  
Marshall chose the latter course. 
 
Marshall’s rationale relied on the distinction between “executory” and “executed” 
treaty provisions. In the terminology that was widely used in the early nineteenth century, 
an executory contract promised future performance, whereas an executed contract 
 
209 See id. at 520-21 (“[T]he case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, decides this case.  It decides that the 
territory in which this land was situated, belonged to the United States at the time that this grant was made 
by the Spanish authority; it decides that this grant is not embraced by the eighth article of the treaty, which 
ceded the Floridas to the United States; that the stipulations in that article are confined to the territory 
which belonged to Spain at the time of the cession, according to the American construction of the treaty”) 
(emphasis added). 
210 See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 184 (1988) 
(volumes 3 and 4 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States) 
(“Throughout most of Marshall’s tenure, the Court had a remarkable percentage of unanimous or near 
unanimous decisions . . . .  For example, between 1816 and 1823, a period in which the Court’s 
composition was unchanged, the Justices produced a total of 302 majority opinions.  In all these cases, only 
twenty-four dissents and eight concurrences were recorded.”) 
211 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 310-13. 
212 The result was that plaintiffs lost because they failed to establish valid title, either on the basis of 
the Spanish grant, or on the basis of Article 8.  Marshall agreed with the majority that Article 8 did not 
grant plaintiffs a complete title to the land at issue, but he agreed for different reasons.  The majority 
thought that the subject property was not within the geographical scope of Article 8.  Marshall thought that 
Article 8 was executory. 
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promised immediate performance.213 Marshall applied this distinction to Article 8 of the 
Florida treaty, which said: “All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 
by His Catholic Majesty or by his lawful authorities . . . shall be ratified and confirmed to 
the persons in possession of the lands . . . .”214 Marshall noted that the article “does not 
say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such been its language, it would have 
acted directly on the subject, and would have repealed those acts of congress which were 
repugnant to it.”215 In short, if Article 8 said that the grants “are hereby confirmed,” it 
would have been an executed treaty provision that granted vested property rights to the 
Spanish grantees.  Since the treaty used the language “shall be ratified and confirmed,” 
however, it was merely executory -- a promise of future action that required legislative 
implementation before the Spanish grantees could obtain vested property rights.216 
The term “vested” rights is important here.  In Marbury v. Madison, Justice 
Marshall devoted a considerable portion of his opinion to establishing the proposition that 
Mr. Marbury’s appointment was not revocable, and that the law creating the office 
granted him “vested” legal rights.217 Marshall then famously declared: “The government 
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for 
the violation of a vested legal right.”218 Thus, in Marshall’s view, the violation of a 
vested legal right requires a remedy, but the violation of a non-vested right does not 
necessarily require a remedy.  Under Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale, Article 8 of 
the treaty granted the plaintiffs an inchoate title in the subject property, but it did not 
 
213 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 443 (explaining the difference between executory 
and executed contracts).  Justice Marshall had previously relied on the distinction between executory and 
executed contracts in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136-37 (1810).  Justice Iredell applied this terminology 
to treaty provisions in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 271-72 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part).  Marshall 
did not use the terms “executed” and “executory” in Foster, but his contemporaries understood that 
Marshall was drawing a distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions in Foster. See Sloss, 
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 19-24.  
214 Florida Treaty, supra note 63, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
215 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added). 
216 Other commentators have generally understood Foster’s distinction between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties to turn on the question whether the treaty has domestic legal effect in the 
absence of implementing legislation.  See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 198-200 (2d ed. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 767 
(1988); Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 174, at 700-02.  This interpretation does not conform to the 
19th century understanding of Foster. See Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 19-24. 
217 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 154-62. 
218 Id. at 163. 
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grant them vested legal rights.219 Moreover, until Congress enacted legislation to execute 
the treaty by granting them vested rights, the judiciary could not provide a remedy.220 
Four years after Foster, in the case of United States v. Percheman,221 Justice 
Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, reversed his decision in Foster, and concluded 
that Article 8 of the Florida treaty was executed, not executory.222 In contrast to Foster,
the land at issue in Percheman was clearly within the territorial scope of Article 8, 
because it was located in East Florida, in an area that was subject to undisputed Spanish 
sovereignty before the 1819 treaty.  Moreover, since the plaintiff claimed on the basis of 
a Spanish grant issued in December 1815, there was no question that Spain had the 
authority to issue the grant.  The grant conveyed to Percheman “two thousand acres of 
land . . . in absolute property.”223 Under principles of international law that were 
generally accepted at that time, when territory passed by treaty from one sovereign to 
another, “[t]he king cedes that only which belonged to him; lands he had previously 
granted, were not his to cede.”224 Thus, even if the parties had not included Article 8 in 
the treaty, Percheman’s property rights “would have been unaffected by the change” in 
sovereigns.225 Therefore, it was apparent to Marshall and the other justices that his 
previous interpretation of Article 8, as applied to property in Florida (east of the Perdido) 
was untenable, because it would have had the effect of divesting landowners of their 
vested property rights.226 Accordingly, Marshall reinterpreted the phrase “shall be 
ratified and confirmed” in the text of Article 8 to mean that the property rights of the 
grantees of Spanish land grants were “ratified and confirmed by the force of the 
instrument itself,” that is, by the force of the treaty.227 In short, the treaty language was 
 
219 Marshall did not use these terms in Foster, but this is the necessary implication of what he did say.  
As noted above, Marshall believed that the land at issue was within the territorial scope of Article 8.  This 
meant that the United States had a duty under Article 8 to “ratify and confirm” the prior Spanish land grant.  
That duty necessarily gave the grantees certain correlative rights.  Since the grant itself was void, though, 
the plaintiffs had no rights by virtue of the grant.  Moreover, in accordance with nineteenth century 
conceptions of property rights, it would have been unthinkable for a treaty -- or any other legal document 
for that matter -- to grant unnamed individuals vested property rights in unspecified land.  Therefore, 
Marshall must have thought that the treaty granted the plaintiffs some type of inchoate property right that 
required legislative action to be perfected into a complete title. 
220 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 (“But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract . . . the legislature 
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”) 
221 32 U.S. 51 (1833). 
222 See id. at 88-89. 
223 Id. at 82-83. 
224 Id. at 87. 
225 Id. at 87. 
226 Percheman had vested property rights before the treaty because the land was granted to him in 
“abolute property.”  Under Marshall’s interpretation of Article 8 in Foster, though, the treaty would have 
converted Percheman’s absolute title into an inchoate property interest that could not be perfected without 
congressional action.  This would have been contrary to natural law principles that were widely accepted at 
the time, and might even have been viewed as an unconstitutional taking. 
227 Id. at 89.  Other commentators have noted that Marshall relied on the Spanish text of the treaty to 
support his reinterpretation of Article 8.  While that explanation is true, it is incomplete.  Marshall also 
relied heavily on the fact that his previous interpretation of Article 8, if applied to land in Florida, would be 
contrary to principles of natural law embodied in the law of nations.  See id. at 86-87 (“The modern usage 
of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is 
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executed, the rights of Spanish grantees were fully vested, and those rights were 
enforceable in the courts.228 
Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale in Foster established an exception to the 
general principle that there is a remedy for every violation of a right: the principle applies 
only to vested rights.  If a treaty provision is executory, then individuals cannot obtain 
judicial remedies for violations of that treaty provision until the provision is executed and 
their rights have vested.  The fact that Marshall himself overruled Foster only four years 
after the case was decided suggests that courts should be cautious in applying this 
exception to the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial remedies for violations of 
individual treaty rights.  If applied cautiously, the Foster exception is generally consistent 
with the fundamental Marshallian presumption.  The Supreme Court has been extremely 
cautious in applying the Foster exception.  In more than 175 years since Marshall’s 
decision in Foster, the Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non-self-
executing treaties to deny a remedy to an individual whose treaty rights were violated.229 
Unfortunately, in recent years, state courts and lower federal courts have expanded the 
Foster exception to the point where it threatens to swallow the underlying principle.   
 
5.  Foster and the Bork Model: Contrary to claims advanced by advocates of the 
Bork model, Foster’s non-self-execution rationale says nothing about private rights of 
action, nor does it establish a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.  If 
modern courts wish to adhere faithfully to Marshall’s non-self-execution rationale, then 
they must examine the relevant treaty language to determine whether it promises 
immediate performance (executed) or future performance (executory).  Marshall’s 
opinion in Foster does not support a presumption that treaties are generally executory. 
 
Borkians may cite the following passage from Foster in defense of their view that 
Foster supports a presumption against self-execution: “A treaty is in its nature a contract 
between two nations, not a legislative act.  It does not generally effect, of itself, the object 
to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into 
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.”230 This 
passage, one could argue, shows that Marshall endorsed the broader principle that treaties 
generally must be “carried into execution by the sovereign power” in order to effect “the 
 
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be 
generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.”) 
228 Modern courts following the Bork model frequently cite Foster, and then include a parenthetical 
comment noting that Percheman overruled Foster “on other grounds.”  See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).  This form of citation is very 
misleading.  Percheman specifically overruled Foster’s holding that Article 8 was executory.   
229 Only once since Foster has the Supreme Court held that a treaty was not self-executing, and that 
was an alternative holding.  See Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1913).  
The main holding was that the Treaty of Brussels did not apply to the patent at issue, and therefore did not 
grant plaintiff the patent rights it asserted.  See id. at 44-47.  More recently, the Supreme Court stated in 
dicta that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not self-executing, but the plaintiff in 
that case did not assert rights under the treaty.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2763, 2767 
(2004).  For a brief survey of Supreme Court decisions involving self-execution, see Sloss, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties, supra note 34, at 71-73. 
230 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
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object to be accomplished.”231 This argument, though, ignores the sentences immediately 
after the quoted language: “In the United States a different principle is established.  Our 
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.  It is, consequently, to be regarded 
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself 
without the aid of any legislative provision.”232 Thus, as others have noted, if one reads 
the entire passage, rather than quoting selected portions of it, it is evident that Marshall’s 
statement that treaties do not effect “the object to be accomplished” is a statement about 
treaties in other countries, not treaties in the United States.233 In Marshall’s view, the 
U.S. constitution establishes “a different principle:” the principle that treaties are “to be 
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature.”234 
The further qualification – that this principle applies whenever a treaty “operates 
of itself” – makes clear that the principle applies only to executed treaty provisions.  But 
this qualification does not establish a presumption that treaties are generally executory.  
To the contrary, the fact that Percheman overruled Foster, and the fact that the Supreme 
Court has never again applied the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties to deny a 
remedy to an individual whose treaty rights were violated, supports the opposite 
presumption: that treaties are generally executed (meaning that treaty obligations are to 
be performed immediately upon entry into force of the treaty) unless the treaty language 
makes it abundantly clear that the drafters intended a particular obligation to be executory 
(meaning that they did not expect the obligation to be performed until some time in the 
future, after entry into force of the treaty). 
 
* * * * *
The conflict between the Bork model and the Marshall model centers around the 
question whether courts have the authority to enforce treaties on behalf of private 
individuals in the absence of express authorization by the political branches.  Between 
1789 and 1838, there were at least 13 cases, and arguably as many as 19 cases, in which 
the Supreme Court enforced treaties on behalf of private individuals without express 
authorization from the political branches.  These Supreme Court decisions demonstrate 
that the Court believed that express authorization was not necessary.  In short, the cases 
demonstrate that the Court understood the role of the judiciary in treaty enforcement in 
accordance with the Marshall model, not the Bork model.   
 
Other decisions by the Supreme Court during this period reinforce this 
conclusion.  The Court decided 57 cases during this period in which an individual litigant 
raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty.  In these 57 cases, the Court never said 
that treaties are not judicially enforceable unless the treaty itself, or a federal statute, 
 
231 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 15, at 2087-89 (making a similar argument). 
232 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.   
233 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2192-94 (1999) 
(developing this argument in greater detail). 
234 The Constitution states explicitly that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by both treaties 
and statutes.  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  Thus, the Framers of our Constitution believed that the principle 
that treaties are “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature” was 
sufficiently important that they included that principle in the text of the Constitution. 
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creates a private right of action.  In these 57 cases, the Court never endorsed a 
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.  In fact, several Supreme Court 
decisions during this period contain language that appears to endorse a presumption in 
favor of judicial enforcement of treaties.235 Moreover, all 57 cases are consistent with the 
Marshall model.  Although Strother, De la Croix and Foster show that there are 
limitations on the Marshallian presumption in favor of judicial enforcement, those cases 
are consistent with the Marshall model because they support, at most, narrow exceptions 
to the general principle that individuals are entitled to judicial remedies for violations of 
their treaty-based individual rights. 
 
III. 
The Origins of the Bork Model 
 
Judge Bork set forth the core elements of the Bork model in a single paragraph in 
his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.236 That paragraph advances 
two main propositions.  First, there is a presumption against private enforcement of 
treaties in U.S. courts.  Second, to overcome that presumption, an individual litigant who 
wishes to enforce a treaty must show either that there is legislation authorizing private 
enforcement, or that the treaty itself creates a private right of action.237 Judge Bork cites 
various authorities for each of these propositions.  Thus, one can trace the origins of the 
Bork model by examining the authorities he cites. 
 
A. The Presumption Against Judicial Enforcement 
Judge Bork cites only one Supreme Court decision, Foster v. Neilson, in support 
of his claim that there is a presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. 
courts.  For the reasons discussed above, Foster does not support any such 
presumption.238 Bork also cites two other federal appellate opinions in support of the 
asserted presumption: Canadian Transport Co. v. United States,239 and Dreyfus v. Von 
Finck.240 In fact, neither case endorses a presumption against private enforcement of 
treaties in U.S. courts.  Thus, Judge Bork invented the Borkian presumption against 
judicial enforcement of treaties in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren.
In Dreyfus v. Von Finck, a Jewish plaintiff who lived in Germany before World 
War II brought suit against West German citizens, seeking recovery for wrongful 
 
235 See, e.g., supra note 4 (quoting Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809)); text at note 
99 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1801)); notes 118-21 and 
accompanying text (analyzing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)); and note 155 (quoting United States v. 
Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42 (1795)). 
236 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring).   
237 See id. Judge Bork did not use the word “presumption” in Tel-Oren. He said that treaties “do not 
generally create rights that are privately enforceable in courts.”  Id. That assumption, though, effectively 
creates a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties when it is combined with Bork’s proposed 
rule that “an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty . . 
. provides a private right of action.”  Id.
238 See supra Part II.D. 
239 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
240 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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confiscation of property in Nazi Germany in 1938.241 Plaintiff invoked several treaties in 
support of his suit.  In evaluating plaintiff’s treaty claims, the court noted that “[i]t is only 
when a treaty . . . prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may 
be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights.”242 Applying this test, the court held 
that none of the treaties invoked by plaintiff “dealt with the expropriation by Germans of 
the property of German citizens, and none conferred any private rights with regard to 
such property which were enforceable in American courts.”243 This analysis is entirely 
consistent with the Marshall model.  The court’s rationale is that the treaties at issue were 
not “enforceable in American courts” because they did not protect the plaintiff’s property 
against confiscation by other Germans.  In short, the plaintiff could not obtain a judicial 
remedy because the treaties did not protect the individual right he asserted. 
 
The court’s opinion in Dreyfus does contain one statement that could be construed 
to support the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies.  The court states that a 
treaty may “contain provisions which confer rights upon the citizens of one of the 
contracting parties which are capable of enforcement as are any other private rights under 
the law.  In general, however, this is not so.”244 Although the italicized language might 
be construed to create a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties, the better 
view is that the court is making two distinct claims.  The first sentence says that, when 
treaties do create individual rights, those rights are judicially enforceable “as are any 
other private rights under the law.”  This statement is entirely consistent with the 
Marshall model.  The second sentence does not create a presumption; it merely makes a 
factual assertion that treaties generally do not create individual rights.  Even if that 
assertion is true, which is debatable, it does not support the Bork model, because the 
Borkian presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties applies even to treaty 
provisions that do create individual rights.245 Dreyfus definitely does not endorse a 
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties that create individual rights.246 
Judge Bork also cited Canadian Transport Co. v. United States247 in support of 
the alleged presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.  In Canadian Transport,
plaintiffs sued the United States for money damages, asserting that an 1815 treaty with 
Great Britain waived the United States’ sovereign immunity.  The D.C. Circuit rejected 
this argument and dismissed the claim on sovereign immunity grounds.248 The opinion 
 
241 Id. at 26. 
242 Id. at 30 
243 Id.
244 Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
245 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
246 In support of the statement quoted above, the court in Dreyfus cited Ian Brownlie, The Place of the 
Individual in International Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 435 (1964).  In that article, Brownlie says: “[I]t is obvious 
that states can agree to confer special rights on individuals . . . .  In general, treaties do not create direct 
rights and obligations for private individuals, but, if it was the intention of the parties to do this, effect can 
be given to the intention.”  Id. at 439-40.  Thus, the citation to Brownlie makes clear that the Dreyfus court 
was not endorsing the Borkian presumption against judicial remedies for violations of treaty provisions that 
create individual rights. 
247 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
248 Id. at 1092-93. 
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includes one clause that appears to support the Bork model: the court stated that “treaty 
violations are normally to be redressed outside the courtroom.”249 
There are several reasons, however, why this statement cannot reasonably be 
construed as an endorsement of the Borkian presumption against private enforcement of 
treaties in U.S. courts.  First, the 1815 treaty at issue in Canadian Transport has been 
enforced by U.S. courts in other contexts, where U.S. sovereign immunity was not 
implicated.250 Second, the full sentence in Canadian Transport states: “In the absence of 
specific language in the treaty waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, the 
treaty must be interpreted in accord with the rule that treaty violations are normally to be 
redressed outside the courtroom.”251 Thus, the court’s main point was that plaintiffs who 
seek money damages against the United States for treaty violations cannot obtain judicial 
relief unless the treaty itself, or some other federal law, waives U.S. sovereign immunity.  
This proposition is consistent with the Marshall model because the Marshall model 
recognizes sovereign immunity as a valid defense to treaty-based claims in appropriate 
circumstances. 
 
Additionally, the cases cited by the court in Canadian Transport actually support 
a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties that create individual rights.  In 
support of its claim that “treaty violations are normally to be redressed outside the 
courtroom,” the court in Canadian Transport quoted the following language from The 
Head Money Cases.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.  It depends for 
the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the 
governments which are parties to it.  If these fail, its infraction becomes the 
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured 
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual 
war.  It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and 
can give no redress.252 
The court, however, omitted the passage from Head Money that follows immediately 
after the language quoted above.  There, the Supreme Court said: 
 
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon 
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits 
of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are 
 
249 Id. at 1092. 
250 See, e.g., United States v. American Machine & Metals, Inc, 29 C.C.P.A. 137 (U.S. Ct. of 
Customs & Patent Appeals 1941) (applying the “most-favored-nation” clause of the 1815 treaty with Great 
Britain, together with other treaties, to support a judgment that importation of machines from England was 
subject only to a twenty percent duty, instead of the sixty percent duty imposed by the collector at the port).  
See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 703-04 (Field, J., dissenting on other grounds) (stating that 
article 1 of the 1815 treaty with Great Britain, and other similar treaty provisions “operate by their own 
force; that is, they require no legislative action for their enforcement”). 
251 663 F.2d at 1092. 
252 Canadian Transport, 663 F.2d at 1092 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)). 
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capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the 
country. . . . The constitution of the United States places such provisions as 
these in the same category as other laws of congress . . . .  A treaty, then, is a 
law of the land as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a 
rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.
And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that 
court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it 
would to a statute.253 
Thus, Head Money Cases supports a presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of 
treaty provisions that “prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen” may be 
determined.  In other words, treaty provisions that create individual rights are 
presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts by private parties.254 
In sum, the authorities cited by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren do not endorse the 
Borkian presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts.  Judge Bork 
made new law in Tel-Oren by inventing the Borkian presumption against judicial 
enforcement of treaties.  Moreover, as the analysis in Part Two demonstrated, he made 
new law that is contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent. 
 
B. The Private Right of Action Test   
 
In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork stated: “Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has 
access to courts for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty . . . 
provides a private right of action.”255 He cited one Supreme Court decision in support of 
this assertion: Head Money Cases. The preceding quotation from Head Money Cases,
though, demonstrates conclusively that the case does not support Judge Bork’s claim.  
The Court in Head Money said nothing about private rights of action.  To the contrary, 
Head Money says that a treaty is judicially enforceable if “its provisions prescribe a rule 
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.”256 In short, 
under Head Money, the critical question is whether a treaty provision creates individual 
rights.  In Tel-Oren, though, Judge Bork recast the issue in terms of remedial rights, 
rather than primary rights.  Thus, whereas Head Money endorses the Marshall model, 
Tel-Oren incorrectly cites Head Money as authority for the Bork model. 
 
253 112 U.S. at 598-99 (emphasis added). 
254 In addition to Head Money Cases, the court in Canadian Transport cited three lower federal court 
decisions in support of its assertion that treaty violations are normally redressed outside the courtroom: 
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976); Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 
(1941); and Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958).  None of these cases endorse the Borkian 
presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S. courts.  For analysis of Dreyfus, see supra notes 
241-46 and accompanying text.  For analysis of Z & F Assets, see infra notes 260-64 and accompanying 
text.  Pauling v. McElroy holds that certain provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement 
for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are not self-executing.  164 F. Supp. at 393.  The opinion does 
not contain any language supporting a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties.   
255 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring). 
256 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.  
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In addition to citing Head Money, Judge Bork cited three federal appellate 
opinions in support of his proposed private right of action test: Z & F Assets Realization 
Corp. v. Hull,257 Diggs v. Richardson,258 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum 
Corp.259 Z & F Assets provides no support for Bork’s private right of action test.  In that 
case, plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration to invalidate a decision by a claims 
commission established pursuant to an international agreement between the United States 
and Germany.260 The D.C. Circuit held that the district court “was without jurisdiction to 
hear or decide” plaintiff’s claim because the claim “involve[d] a political and not a 
judicial question.”261 The D.C. Circuit recognized that “courts, in the exercise of their 
judicial functions must interpret and apply” treaties.262 According to Z & F Assets, that is 
true only if the treaty at issue “prescribes a rule by which rights of individuals under it 
may be determined.”263 If the treaty does not prescribe such a rule, then “the alleged 
controversies arising out of treaty relationships . . . are not cases within the meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution and, consequently, are not subject to judicial 
determination.”264 Nowhere in Z & F Assets, however, did the court suggest that a treaty 
is not judicially enforceable unless it creates a private right of action. 
 
In Diggs v. Richardson, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent the U.S. government “from continuing to deal with the South Africans 
concerning the importation of seal furs from Namibia.”265 Plaintiffs based their claim on 
a U.N. Security Council resolution urging “member states to have no dealings with South 
Africa which impliedly recognize the legality of that country’s occupation of the former 
U.N. territory of Namibia.”266 The D.C. Circuit held that the U.N. Security Council 
resolution was not self-executing.267 The court elaborated on this holding by stating that 
the particular provisions of the resolution invoked by the plaintiffs “do not by their terms 
confer rights upon individual citizens.”268 This statement is consistent with the Marshall 
model; it suggests that the court denied relief on the grounds that the resolution at issue 
did not create or protect individual rights, at least not for the plaintiffs in Diggs.
Diggs contains two other statements, though, that are arguably inconsistent with 
the Marshall model.  In one, the court stated that the U.N. resolution “does not confer 
rights on the citizens of the United States that are enforceable in court in the absence of 
 
257 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
258 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
259 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
260 See Z & F Assets, 114 F.2d at 465-67. 
261 Id. at 468.  The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds.  See Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. 
Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941). 
262 Z & F Assets, 114 F.2d at 470. 
263 Id. at 470, n.19 (citing SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 
160-61 (2d ed. 1916)).  As in Head Money Cases, the court’s analysis in Z & F Assets focuses on primary 
rights, not remedial rights.  Thus, Z & F Assets is consistent with the Marshall model, not the Bork model. 
264 Id. at 470. 
265 555 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
266 Id.
267 See id. at 850, n.9. 
268 Id. at 851. 
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implementing legislation.”269 Similarly, the court stated that the specific provisions at 
issue “do not confer on individual citizens rights that are judicially enforceable in 
American domestic courts.”270 Both statements could be construed to mean that the U.N. 
resolution does create individual rights for the Diggs plaintiffs, but those rights are not 
enforceable in U.S. courts.  Under that interpretation, Diggs would be inconsistent with 
the Marshall model.  Even if that interpretation is correct, though, Diggs does not say that 
there is a presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties, nor does it state or imply 
that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty creates a private right of action.  
Therefore, Diggs does not endorse the Bork model.271 
In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork also cited Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.272 
in support of the proposition that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty 
creates a private right of action.  In Mannington Mills, plaintiff alleged that defendant had 
violated U.S. antitrust law by securing patents from foreign countries through fraudulent 
means.273 The Third Circuit remanded plaintiff’s antitrust claim for additional 
factfinding.  In addition to raising an antitrust claim, plaintiff also alleged that defendant 
violated two multilateral intellectual property treaties by securing foreign patents through 
fraud.274 The Third Circuit dismissed this claim on the grounds that the treaties did not 
provide a private right of action.275 Thus, Mannington Mills applied the Borkian private 
right of action test before Judge Bork endorsed that test in Tel-Oren. (Mannington Mills 
was not the first case to do so.  Dreyfus v. Von Finck, decided by the Second Circuit in 
1976, was the first case in which a U.S. court applied the private right of action test to a 
treaty-based claim.276)
There are three reasons why Mannington Mills provides at best limited support for 
the Bork model.  First, none of the authorities cited by the court in Mannington Mills 
endorse the Bork model.277 Second, Mannington Mills does not endorse the Borkian 
presumption against judicial remedies for treaty violations.278 Third, in contrast to Judge 
 
269 Id. at 850. 
270 Id. at 851. 
271 Even so, Diggs is an important antecedent for the Bork model because the D.C. Circuit in Diggs,
like Judge Bork in Tel-Oren, conflated questions of primary law with questions of remedial law. 
272 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
273 Id. at 1290. 
274 Id. at 1298.  The two treaties at issue were the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Pan-American 
Convention of 1910. 
275 Id. at 1298-99. 
276 Dreyfus, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (“We conclude that the District Court was correct in 
holding that no private right of action could be based on the four treaties referred to in plaintiff’s 
complaint.”)  For the reasons discussed above, the bulk of the analysis in Dreyfus is consistent with the 
Marshall model, and Dreyfus does not endorse the Borkian presumption against judicial enforcement of 
treaties.  See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. 
277 The treaty portion of the court’s opinion in Mannington Mills cites four cases: Head Money Cases, 
112 U.S. 580 (1884); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 
24 (2d Cir. 1976); and Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940).  For the 
reasons discussed above, none of these cases support the Bork model.  See supra notes 241-71 and 
accompanying text. 
278 The court in Mannington Mills did make the following statement: “Like private rights under law, a 
treaty may confer rights capable of enforcement, but this is not the general rule.”  595 F.2d at 1298.  This 
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Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren, the court in Mannington Mills did not endorse any broad 
generalization to the effect that individuals cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty itself 
creates a private right of action.  Mannington Mills addressed a specific case in which one 
private party sued another private party for money damages.  The court in Mannington 
Mills did not purport to articulate a rule governing judicial enforcement of treaties by 
criminal defendants, or by federal habeas petitioners, for example.  Thus, Judge Bork’s 
opinion in Tel-Oren goes well beyond the precedent set by Mannington Mills because 
Bork’s opinion suggests that criminal defendants and habeas petitioners, among others, 
cannot enforce treaties unless the treaty itself, or a federal statute, provides a private right 
of action. 
 
C. Explaining the Rise of the Bork Model 
 
The Bork model of treaty enforcement emerged when lower federal courts 
combined two previously separate lines of cases: one related to the doctrine of non-self-
executing treaties, and the other related to implied rights of action.  In 1975, in Cort v. 
Ash,279 the Supreme Court initiated a series of decisions that effectively created a 
presumption against recognizing implied rights of action in cases where individual 
plaintiffs sue to enforce rights under federal statutes.280 In Dreyfus v. Von Finck,
Mannington Mills, and Tel-Oren, federal judges transplanted the Supreme Court’s 
implied right of action jurisprudence from the statutory context to the treaty context.  
That doctrinal innovation produced significant changes in both non-self-execution 
doctrine and implied right of action doctrine whose implications have not yet been fully 
appreciated. 
 
Prior to the advent of the Bork model in the 1970s and 1980s, non-self-execution 
doctrine had not generated a substantial right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties.  
Courts applying non-self-execution doctrine generally followed the test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Head Money Cases: that an individual can enforce a treaty in a U.S. 
court “whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen 
or subject may be determined.”281 Under the Head Money test, there was little or no 
right-remedy gap because treaties that protected individual rights were at least 
presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts.  Granted, there were other versions of non-self-
execution doctrine, but those other versions were generally consistent with the maxim 
“where there is a right, there is a remedy.”282 The Bork model replaced the Head Money 
statement arguably suggests that there is no presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties, but it 
does not endorse a presumption against judicial enforcement.  Moreover, immediately after this statement, 
the court in Mannington Mills quoted language from Head Money Cases that supports judicial enforcement 
of treaty provisions that create individual rights.  Thus, Mannington Mills does not endorse the Borkian 
presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. 
279 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
280 See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 781-82 (5th ed. 2003).  
281 112 U.S. at 598-99 (1884).  See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (CA 1952) (applying 
the Head Money test and concluding that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are not self-
executing). 
282 Prior to the emergence of the Bork model, there were three different versions of non-self-
execution doctrine.  The first version was the Head Money version, which did not create a substantial right-
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primary rights test with a private right of action test.  The Borkian right of action test 
creates a huge gap between treaty-based rights and domestic judicial remedies because 
most treaties that protect individual rights do not create an express private right of action. 
 
The Bork model also deviates substantially from the implied right of action 
doctrine that the Supreme Court has applied in the context of federal statutes.  Plaintiffs 
can bring suit against state and local government officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
enforce federal statutes that do not create a private right of action, as long as the statute 
they seek to enforce creates federal rights.283 Plaintiffs can also bring suit against federal 
government officers under the Administrative Procedure Act to enjoin federal executive 
action that violates a federal statute, even if the statute does not create a private right of 
action.284 The Supreme Court has never held that a criminal defendant must show that a 
federal statute creates a private right of action in order to invoke that statute as a defense 
to a criminal charge.  Nor has the Court said that a habeas petitioner must show that a 
federal statute creates a private right of action in order to invoke that statute in support of 
a petition for habeas corpus relief.   
 
In short, although the Supreme Court has endorsed a presumption against 
recognizing implied rights of action under federal statutes, there are a wide variety of 
remedial mechanisms that enable individual litigants to enforce federal statutory rights, 
even when the statute at issue does not create a private right of action.  The Bork model, 
in contrast, precludes the use of any remedial mechanism -- by criminal defendants, 
habeas petitioners, or civil plaintiffs -- to enforce treaty-based individual rights unless the 
treaty itself creates a private right of action, or Congress has authorized private 
enforcement of the treaty.  Thus, the Bork model imposes far more draconian constraints 
on the judicial enforcement of treaty rights than the Supreme Court has imposed on the 
judicial enforcement of statutory rights. 
 
remedy gap.  (The Head Money version is a variant of the original Foster version.  I count both as a single 
version of non-self-execution doctrine.  See Sloss, supra note 34, at 19-29.)  A second version holds that 
implementing legislation is constitutionally required to give effect to some treaty provisions.  See Sloss, 
supra note 34, at 29-35.  That version of non-self-execution doctrine does not create a right-remedy gap 
because it applies primarily to treaty provisions that obligate the United States to appropriate money, and 
such treaty provisions do not create individual rights.  A third version of non-self-execution doctrine is 
what I have called the “Restatement doctrine,” because the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations 
Law, published in 1965, created this version of the doctrine.  See Sloss, supra note 34, at 12-18, 70-75.  
The Restatement doctrine does create a right-remedy gap, but very few courts applied the doctrine before 
1984, when Judge Bork published his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren. The leading example is United 
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-84 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the Restatement doctrine and holding that 
article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is not self-executing). 
283 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). 
284 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004) (where plaintiffs sued to 
enforce a statute that did not create a private right of action, Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, 
held that “[t]he APA authorizes suit” for federal statutory violations “[w]here no other statute provides a 
private right of action”). 
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The Supreme Court should reject the Bork model for three reasons.  First, the 
Bork model is at odds with the Founders’ original understanding of the judiciary’s role in 
treaty enforcement.  Second, the Bork model is a radical departure from two centuries of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Third, application of the Bork model produces extremely 
harmful consequences. 
 
The foregoing analysis of Supreme Court decisions from 1789 to 1838 
demonstrates that the Court consistently applied the Marshallian presumption in favor of 
judicial remedies for treaty violations.  During this period, the Court never applied the 
Borkian presumption against judicial remedies, nor did it endorse the Borkian private 
right of action test.  Supreme Court decisions during the early years of U.S. constitutional 
history, by themselves, do not provide conclusive proof of the Founders’ original 
understanding.  Those decisions, however, are generally consistent with the constitutional 
text and eighteenth century historical materials.  The constitutional text expressly grants 
both state and federal courts the power to enforce treaties.285 Other scholars have 
analyzed eighteenth century historical materials to show that the Framers purposefully 
designed the constitution to make treaties self-executing.286 This article’s analysis of 
nineteenth century case law supplements these other sources.  The analysis shows that 
Supreme Court decisions from 1789 to 1838 manifest the Founders’ original 
understanding that the judiciary has both the power and the duty to enforce treaties on 
behalf of individuals whose treaty-based rights are violated, and that courts do not need 
express authorization from the political branches to provide remedies for violations of 
individual treaty rights. 
 
There is a striking contrast between early nineteenth century Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, which conformed to the Marshall model, and late twentieth century 
decisions by lower courts that have applied the Bork model.  The Bork model emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s when federal appellate judges merged the pre-existing doctrine of 
non-self-executing treaties with the then-emerging presumption against finding implied 
rights of action under federal statutes.  The merger of these two doctrines produced a 
revolution in both non-self-execution doctrine and implied right of action doctrine.  
Whereas prior non-self-execution doctrine was generally consistent with the maxim 
“where there is a right, there is a remedy,” Borkian non-self-execution doctrine created a 
huge right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties.  Whereas implied right of action 
doctrine, as applied in the statutory context, has never imposed a bar to judicial 
enforcement of federal statutes on behalf of habeas petitioners, or criminal defendants, 
 
285 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under . . . Treaties.”); U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2 (specifying that “the Judges in every State shall be 
bound” by treaties).  
286 See Flaherty, supra note 15; Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1097-1114. 
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courts are now applying the Borkian private right of action test to bar judicial 
enforcement of treaties on behalf of habeas petitioners and criminal defendants.287 
Application of the Bork model generates three different types of harmful 
consequences, which relate to federal supremacy, separation of powers, and U.S. foreign 
relations.  Under the Articles of Confederation, states were routinely violating U.S. treaty 
obligations and the federal government was powerless to halt those violations.288 The 
Framers’ solution to this problem, embodied in the Supremacy Clause, was to give 
treaties the status of federal law, and to make treaties directly binding on judges in state 
courts.289 In recent years, state and local governments have routinely violated U.S. 
obligations under Article 36(1) of the VCCR,290 just as state governments violated U.S. 
treaty obligations before adoption of the Constitution.  If courts applied the Marshall 
model, most law enforcement officers would probably stop violating the VCCR to avoid 
the likely consequences of continued violations: reversal of convictions or exclusion of 
evidence.291 The treaty violations persist, however, because courts have applied the Bork 
model and refused to enforce the treaty.  Thus, continued application of the Bork model 
perpetuates the very problem of treaty violations by state officers that the Framers 
thought they solved by including treaties in the text of the Supremacy Clause. 
 
The second harmful consequence relates to separation of powers.  The Geneva 
Conventions are supreme federal law under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause.  
Accordingly, the President has a duty under the Take Care Clause292 to ensure that the 
treaties are faithfully executed.293 The President’s decision to utilize military 
commissions to conduct trials of several Guantanamo detainees is a violation of the 
Geneva Conventions,294 and therefore a violation of the President’s duty to take care that 
 
287 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Bork model and 
denying relief to habeas petitioner who alleged violation of his rights under the POW Convention); State v. 
Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-78 (Or. 2005) (applying Bork model and denying relief to criminal 
defendant who alleged violation of his rights under the VCCR). 
288 See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1101-04. 
289 See id. at 1104-10.    See also Flaherty, supra note 15, at 2120-26. 
290 Article 36(1) of the VCCR grants foreign nationals arrested in the United States a right to consult 
with consular officers from their home countries.  See VCCR, supra note 7, art. 36, ¶ 1(a).  The United 
States has a treaty obligation to “inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under” Article 36.  
Id., ¶ 1(b).  State and local officers frequently violate the notification requirement under article 36(1)(b). 
291 In many of the VCCR cases, government officers can make a plausible argument that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the violation of his or her treaty rights.  The Marshall model does not 
require a remedy in cases where the individual was not prejudiced.  In other cases, though, individual 
defendants probably were prejudiced by the denial of their rights under the VCCR.  The Marshall model 
does not mandate a particular remedy in cases where an individual is prejudiced by a violation of his treaty 
rights, but it does require an effective remedy.  The two types of remedies most frequently requested by  
defendants in VCCR cases are exclusion of evidence (if the treaty violation is discovered before trial) and 
reversal of a conviction (if the treaty violation is discovered after trial).    
292 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (obligating the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
293 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 Cornell 
L. Rev. 97, 154-64 (2004). 
294 This statement assumes that the detainees are protected by the Geneva Conventions, either as 
prisoners of war or under Common Article 3.  For a defense of this assumption, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
No. 05-184, Brief of Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks and Anne-Marie Slaughter as Amicus Curiae 
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the treaties are faithfully executed.  The judiciary has a constitutional responsibility to 
restrain federal executive action that violates federal law, including treaties.  In Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, the D.C. Circuit abdicated its responsibility to restrain illegal executive 
action by refusing to halt the use of military commissions that violate the Geneva 
Conventions.295 The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to enforce the Geneva Conventions is directly 
attributable to its application of the Bork model.296 When federal courts turn a blind eye 
to executive action that violates federal law, they distort the constitutional balance of 
power by ceding too much power to the President, and diminishing the relative powers of 
the legislative and judicial branches.  Thus, Hamdan shows how application of the Bork 
model induces courts to abdicate their responsibility to restrain illegal executive action, 
thereby distorting the constitutional balance of power among the branches. 
 
Finally, judicial application of the Bork model harms the United States’ 
international reputation.  Ongoing U.S. violations of both the VCCR and the POW 
Convention contribute to a growing perception around the world that the United States is 
hostile to international law.  More specifically, other countries accuse the U.S. of trying 
to develop an international system in which other states are constrained by international 
law, but the U.S. is free to pursue its national interests, unfettered by the requirements of 
international law.  Proponents of the Bork model may object that it is inappropriate for 
courts to concern themselves with international perceptions of U.S. behavior.  That 
objection, though, merely serves to highlight the intellectual gulf between the Marshall 
Court and modern Borkians.  According to a leading historical account, the Marshall 
Court’s decisions manifested “deep concern that the United States be known for its 
adherence to international law and its respect for treaty obligations. . . . In construing 
treaties of the Untied States, the Court exercised great liberality in broadening the rights 
of the signatory powers and those claiming under them.”297 Modern courts would do 
well to follow the Marshallian example. 
 
Supporting Reversal, available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/briefs. If a particular detainee is a 
prisoner of war, then trial by military commission would violate Article 102 of the POW Convention.  See 
POW Convention, supra note 5, art. 102.  If the detainee is protected by Common Article 3, trial by 
military commission is also prohibited because that article requires that he be tried only by a “regularly 
constituted court.”  See POW Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, para. 1(d). 
295 See Hamdan, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  The D.C. Circuit held that “Congress authorized the 
military commission that will try Hamdan.”  Id. at 37-38.  If this conclusion is correct, then the court would 
be justified in denying Hamdan’s habeas petition because Congress has the constitutional power to 
authorize actions that violate U.S. treaty obligations.  The claim that Congress authorized the use of 
military commissions, however, is not persuasive.  See Amicus Brief of 280 Law Professors (contending 
that Congress has not approved the use of military commissions), available at 
http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/briefs. Assuming that Congress has not authorized the use of military 
commissions that violate the Geneva Conventions, the President has a constitutional duty to comply with 
the treaties, and the courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that the President executes his duty. 
296 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that “this country has 
traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they do not create judicially enforceable 
individual rights”); id. at 40 (holding that the habeas statute merely granted the district court jurisdiction 
over Hamdan’s habeas petition, but it “did not render the Geneva Convention judicially enforceable”). 
297 Haskins & Johnson, supra note 146, at 557. 
